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INTRODUCTION 
Law and development are inextricably intertwined.  Law, 
or more precisely the rule of law, facilitates and helps to guide 
development.1  Conversely, as Oliver Wendell Holmes notes in 
opening his Common Law, “[t]he law embodies the story of a 
nation’s development through many centuries, and it cannot 
be dealt with as if it contained only the axioms and corollaries 
of a book of mathematics.”2  The law embodies this story 
through its rich history of precedent.3  Or, in the words of the 
New York Court of Appeals the law follows a “customary 
incremental common-law development process, rooted in 
particular fact patterns and keener wisdom acquired through 
observations of empirical application of a proportioned, less 
than absolute, rule in future cases.”4 
As the growing literature on path dependence 
 
 1.  Victoria Nourse & Gregory Shaffer, Varieties of New Legal Realism: Can 
a New World Order Prompt a New Legal Theory?, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 124 
(2006) (noting that “[t]he ravages of fascism and communism made clear the need 
for the rule of law.”); Hassane Cissé, Empowerment of the Poor: Past, Present, and 
Future, THE WORLD BANK LEGAL REVIEW: LEGAL INNOVATIONS AND 
EMPOWERMENT FOR DEVELOPMENT 17, 32 (Hassane Cissé et al. eds., 2012) 
(discussing rule of law in the context of the development literature). 
 2.  OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881). 
 3.  Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2651 (2014) (Kagan, J., dissenting) 
(quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991)).  On the importance of the 
narrative aspect of law, see Adeno Addis, In Defense of Crookedness, 1992 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 947, 959 (1992). 
 4.  Norcon Power Partners, L.P. v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 92 N.Y.2d 
458, 467 (N.Y. 1998) 
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demonstrates, such development is not without problems.5  
Path dependence is a theory adopted from economics and the 
social sciences.6  It submits that once a path is chosen, this 
choice itself affects possible future action to the point of locking 
in earlier paths even when this becomes comparatively 
inefficient.7  For instance, once Microsoft Windows became the 
leading personal computer operating system, path dependence 
would suggest that it would be difficult to displace Windows 
even with a better product simply because of the decision of 
earlier consumers to purchase Windows-operated computers.8   
In the locus classicus of the path dependence legal 
literature, Oona Hathaway showcases that in many instances, 
legal development similarly enforces imprudent or at least not 
fully considered policy preferences simply because of the 
sequence and manner in which decisions were put to the 
 
 5.  Mark Bartholomew & John Tehranian, An Intersystemic View of 
Intellectual Property and Free Speech, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 83-6 (2013) 
(explaining intellectual property law regimes by reference to path dependence); 
Yun-Chien Chang & Henry Smith, An Economic Analysis of Civil Versus Common 
Law Property, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 16–20 (2012) (using path dependence 
to explain both civil and common law of property “styles”); David Freeman 
Engstrom, Private Enforcement’s Pathways: Lessons from Qui Tam Litigation, 
114 COLUM. L. REV. 1913, 1941–43 (2014) (discussing path dependency as a 
potential means for private litigants to have significant policy impact in the 
formation of legal rules); Tom Ginsburg, Jonathan S. Masur & Richard H. 
McAdams, Libertarian Paternalism, Path Dependence, and Temporary Law, 81 
U. CHI. L. REV. 291, 294 (2014) (applying path dependence to discussions of 
market failure); Zachary Gubler, Experimental Rules, 55 B.C. L. REV. 129, 139–
41 (2014) (noting the obstacles path dependence places in the way of legal 
experimentation); Oona Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and 
Pattern of Legal Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601 (2001); 
J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Climate Change Meets Law of the Horse, 62 DUKE 
L.J. 975, 982 (2013) (arguing that “[d]ecisions made today about climate change 
adaptation—whether shaping the course of evolution or sitting back and 
watching the drama unfold—may become ‘sticky,’ leading to path dependence and 
making it increasingly difficult to change course if the need becomes apparent.”). 
 6.  See Lars Magnusson & Jan Ottosson, Path Dependence: Some 
Introductory Remarks, in THE EVOLUTION OF PATH DEPENDENCE 1, 1 (Lars 
Magnusson & Jan Ottoson eds., 2009) (discussing the history of path dependence 
in the social sciences). 
 7.  Id. at 4 (providing alternative definitions of path dependence and 
concluding that systems are path independent where “the initial conditions will 
not hamper future development”). 
 8. Irina D. Manta & David S. Olson, Hello Barbie: First They Will Monitor 
You, Then They Will Discriminate Against You. Perfectly, 67 ALA. L. REV. 135, 
161–72 (2015)  (discussing the role of path dependence in Microsoft’s pricing 
decisions and success). 
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courts.9  Once a path is chosen, it is extraordinarily difficult for 
law to change course and self-correct in a manner that, all 
things considered, may be more appropriate;10  law and the 
rule of law,11 in other words, are “path dependent.”12 
The legal literature on path dependence so far has not 
provided a normative defense of path dependence in its own 
right.  Rather, the literature so far has focused on the doctrinal, 
practical, and strategic consequences of path dependence.13  
This leaves a key aspect of path dependence significantly 
undertheorized. 
Current events lend further urgency to providing a 
normative defense of path dependence.  Recent failures to 
indict law enforcement officers killing unarmed civilians have 
led some commentators to lay blame at the feet of the American 
 
 9.  Hathaway, supra note 5, at 605.  Professor Hathaway’s article has been 
cited in 186 law review articles since its original publication a little more than a 
decade ago. 
 10.  Hathaway, supra note 5, at 605. 
 11.  See Kevin T. Jackson, The Normative Logic of Global Economic 
Governance: In Pursuit of Non-Instrumental Justification for the Rule of Law and 
Human Rights, 22 MINN. J. INT’L L. 71, 111 (2013) (linking thin rule of law 
conceptions to securing “a reasonable degree of certainty and predictability.”); 
Benjamin Van Rooij & Pip Nicholson, Inflationary Trends in Law and 
Development, 24 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 297 (2013) (noting that “thin 
conceptualizations of the rule of law . . . stress[] the predictability . . . of 
rules . . .”); Joseph Raz, The Rule of Law and its Virtue, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW, 
ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 210, 213 (Joseph Raz ed., 1979) (“the law must be 
capable of being obeyed.”). 
 12.  Hathaway, supra note 5, at 605. 
 13.  See, e.g., John Bell, Path Dependence and Legal Development, 87 TUL. L. 
REV. 787, 788 (2013) (“This Article not only suggests that path dependence is an 
important explanation in comparative law but also recognizes that the law does 
develop by breaking out of the mould cast by the past.”); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., 
The “Conservative” Paths of the Rehnquist Court’s Federalism Decisions, 69 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 429, 436–37 (2002) (using path dependence to explain surprising 
decisions of the Rehnquist Court); Amir N. Licht, The Mother of All Path 
Dependencies, Towards a Cross-Cultural Theory of Corporate Governance, 26 
DEL. J. CORP. L. 147, 161–65 (2001) (arguing that corporate governance is 
culturally path dependent); David A. Weisbach, Thinking Outside the Little 
Boxes: A Response to Professor Schlunk, 80 TEX. L. REV. 893, 896–904 (2002) 
(discussing path dependence in the tax law context).  Lawrence Friedman, Path 
Dependence and the External Constraints on Independent State 
Constitutionalism, 115 PENN. ST. L. REV. 783, 818–31 (2011) (discussing the 
impact of path dependence on the interpretation of state constitutions by 
reference to federal jurisprudence).  But see Alain Maricano & Elias L. Khalil, 
Optimization, Path Dependence and the Law: Can Judges Promote Efficiency?, 32 
INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 72 (2012) (discussing path dependence from the point of 
view of efficiency). 
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justice system.14  The argument made by such advocates 
similarly draws on path dependence: the American justice 
system, they submit, yields unjust results because of its 
habitual ill-treatment of minorities.15  This claim can draw on 
at least some of the darker parts of American jurisprudence as 
proof.16  Both the state of scholarly literature and current 
events lead one to ask: why would we even want the rule of 
law?  Can development according to the rule of law assist in 
making relevant “the stories and sources that traditionally 
have been excluded from the polity’s conversational table?”17 
Problematically, the orthodox justification of legal 
development is unavailing in answering this question.  Recent 
literature argues that legal development protects reliance 
interests.18  This explanation certainly can be applied even in 
the context of wrong decisions.19  But such a justification begs 
the question: what if patterns giving rise to socially sanctioned 
reliance interests themselves are deeply questionable?20  In 
such a society, why should we nevertheless trust in the rule of 
the law as a tool for beneficial development? 
This Article proposes to address this normative 
challenge.21  It posits that development under the rule of law, 
 
 14.  Albert Burneko, The American Justice System Is Not Broken, THE 
CONCOURSE (March 12, 2014), http://theconcourse.deadspin.com/the-american-
justice-system-is-not-broken-1666445407. 
 15.  Id. (“Policing in America is not broken.  The judicial system is not broken. 
American society is not broken.  All are functioning perfectly, doing exactly what 
they have done since before some of this nation’s most prosperous slave-
murdering robber-barons came together to consecrate into statehood the 
mechanisms of their barbarism.”) 
 16.  See Hon. Shira Scheindlin & Matthew L. Schwartz, With All Due 
Deference: Judicial Responsibility in a Time of Crisis, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 795, 
841 (2004) (“Korematsu is a major embarrassment, trumped only by Dred Scott 
v. Sandford, Plessy v. Ferguson, and Lochner v. New York.”). 
 17.  Addis, supra note 3, at 959. 
 18.  Hillel Levin, A Reliance Approach to Precedent, 47 GA. L. REV. 1035 
(2013). 
 19.  See Raz, supra note 11, at 213, 221 (noting that the rule of law “says 
nothing about fundamental rights, about equality, or justice” and even “can 
violate people’s dignity in many ways”). 
 20.  AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE 166–67 (2009) (discussing the 
prevalence of such biases from a social scientific point of view). 
 21.  On the definition of definition – and its importance – see, e.g., Bruce 
Markell, Truth?, 72 IND. L.J. 1115, 1126–31 (1987) (discussing how to define 
definitions and the importance of the question for legal discourse); Frederick 
Schauer, The Best Laid Plans, 120 YALE L.J. 586, 617–18 (2010) (discussing anti-
essentialism, and its question of definition, in U.S. jurisprudence). 
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while imperfect and frequently far from good, constitutes a 
critical backbone for sustainable, self-improving self-
government.22  It demonstrates how path dependence is critical 
to the ability of law to bring about and sustain such self-
improving self-government.  It submits that while slow, legal 
development does include and protect members of 
marginalized social groups and increases their capability to 
engage governance processes and broadens their 
opportunities.23  This Article identifies the values of legal 
development along four dimensions: openness,24 prosperity,25 
freedom,26 and criticality.27 It posits further that development 
must possess each of these dimensions at the same time and 
that no trade-offs between dimensions are permissible or 
cognizable.28 
This Article begins by addressing head on whether the 
inflexibility identified by path dependence means that law does 
not value openness.29  This Article addresses how path 
dependence treats facts; it shows that path dependence is by 
nature factually open.30 This, in turn, entails and explains 
openness at the normative level.31  Legal path dependence thus 
helps to explain how the rule of law can at once exhibit “long 
periods of stability” and be open.32  It becomes a constitutive 
force of the open society and an open social order.33 
This Article next addresses prosperity.34  An open society 
 
 22.  This Article uses a thin conception of the rule of law.  For a discussion of 
thin and thick conceptions of the rule of law, see citations in footnote 11.  To 
defend path dependence, it is necessary to presuppose a thin rule of law 
conception because thick rule of law conceptions introduce “justice” as an element 
of rule of law thus begging the definitional question posed by this Article.  Id. 
 23. AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 17–18 (1999) (explaining the 
process participation/ opportunity dichotomy). 
 24. See discussion infra Part I. 
 25. See discussion infra Part II. 
 26. See discussion infra Part III. 
 27. See discussion infra Part IV. 
 28. See discussion infra Part V. 
 29. See discussion infra Part I. 
 30. See discussion infra Part I. 
 31. See discussion infra Part I.B. 
 32. Hathaway, supra note 5, at 614. 
 33. SEN, supra note 23, at 287–88 (“Do democracy and civil rights help to 
promote the process of development? Rather, the emergence and consolidation of 
these rights can be seen as being constitutive of the process of development.”). 
 34. See discussion infra Part II. 
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requires the material conditions for sustainable growth.35  This 
Article explains that path dependence creates the conditions 
for economic growth by aiming to protect the property rights of 
as broad of a segment of society as possible.36 
This Article then engages freedom.37  Amartya Sen and 
Martha Nussbaum show that prosperity affects political 
freedoms from an economic and social theoretical vantage 
point.38  Their work suggests that legal development almost by 
definition reveals a value of social freedom inherent in the form 
of social organization the law fosters.39  The value of freedom 
inherent in American law arises from the deeply humanist 
republican tradition prevalent at the time of its founding.40  
This tradition views freedom as a paradigm of non-
domination.41  This paradigm of non-domination requires most 
immediately that decisions affecting any person or group in 
society be taken by reference to the interests and opinions of 
that group.42  By adopting a paradigm of non-domination, law 
becomes not only a safeguard of an open society, but of an open 
self-governing society. 
This leaves the question of whether and how law fosters 
social self-reflection.43  This Article submits that law evolves 
according to the value of criticality, or critical judgment.44  
Critical engagement of historical precedent distinguishes 
development from chaotic change.45  As will become apparent, 
the roots of American republican constitutionalism remain 
 
 35. See discussion infra Part II.A. 
 36. See discussion infra Part II.A. 
 37. See discussion infra Part II.C. 
 38. SEN, supra note 23 (focusing on the economic link between prosperity and 
political freedoms); in philosophy by MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, CREATING 
CAPABILITIES, THE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT APPROACH (2013) (critiquing theories 
of economic development on the basis of ethical principles of human dignity); 
MARTHA NUSSBAUM, POLITICAL EMOTIONS 115–36 (2013) (discussing the role of 
the capabilities approach in the context of economic growth). 
 39.  SEN, supra note 23, at 287–88. 
 40.  See Philip A. Hamburger, The Constitution’s Accommodation of Social 
Change, 88 MICH. L. REV. 239, 254 (1989) (“It is now also apparent that a 
relatively wide range of late eighteenth-century Americans were familiar with 
some accounts of natural law, with the notion of the ancient constitution, and 
with civic humanism.”) 
 41.  See discussion infra Part III.C. 
 42.  See discussion infra Part III.C. 
 43.  See discussion infra Part IV. 
 44.  See discussion infra Part IV. 
 45.  See discussion infra Part IV. 
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strong within the U.S. jurisprudential paradigm and its 
engagement of time, tradition, and precedent.46 
This Article demonstrates how hotly debated issues with 
regard to each dimension can only be resolved by placing it in 
the context of the other three.  This Article explains that law 
can harness efficiencies only through a combination of the four 
dimensions of development.  Openness engenders prosperity, 
prosperity freedom, freedom critical thought and vice versa.47  
In economic terms, “development” means an organic pursuit of 
the law to find Pareto superior configurations of the four 
dimensions, i.e., configurations that unleash the maximum 
efficiencies between the four dimensions without loss in 
support for any one dimension.48 
This Article concludes that it is possible to justify the rule 
of law, even the rule of American law, to those whom law 
currently disadvantages.  The very features that made the rule 
of law appear flawed and oppressive in isolation are the means 
to extending the benefits of an open, prosperous, self-governing 
society to an ever-increasing number of people.  The path to 
these benefits may be slow.  But each step taken is sustainable.  
And with each step taken, the law provides its critics with less 
of a right to complain that law does not cure all social ills.  With 
each step taken, it instead imposes a duty on all, the 
advantaged, the disadvantaged, and critics alike to take 
ownership of their own fate and the fate of their community 
further to secure and improve the commonweal of which they 
 
 46.  See discussion infra Part IV. 
 47.  The efficiencies between these dimensions have been discussed in 
economics by SEN, supra note 23 (focusing on the economic link between 
prosperity and political freedoms); MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, CREATING 
CAPABILITIES, THE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT APPROACH (2013) (critiquing theories 
of economic development on the basis of ethical principles of human dignity); 
J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT, FLORENTINE POLITICAL 
THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION (1979) (focusing on the 
importance of critical judgment for the opening up of money-based trading 
empires in Renaissance Italy and the emergence of republican thought in 
England and the Americas); J.G.A. POCOCK, POLITICAL THOUGHT AND HISTORY: 
ESSAYS ON POLITICAL THOUGHT AND HISTORY, CHIEFLY EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 
(1985) (same). 
 48.  See also Ryan Bubb & Richard H. Pildes, How Behavioral Economics 
Trims its Sails and Why, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1593, 1602 (2014) (using Pareto 
optimality in the context of neoclassic theory of regulation); John Morley, The 
Separation of Funds and Managers: A Theory of Investment Fund Structure and 
Regulation, 123 YALE L.J. 1228 (2014) (using Pareto optimality in the context of 
investment fund management principles). 
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all form part.  Law, in other words, makes members of society 
the owners of their own development. 
I. OPENNESS 
The first dimension of development is the openness of law 
to outside influence.49  This dimension gives law width and 
breadth.50  It determines what can influence or bring about 
legal change.51 
In Path Dependence in the Law, Oona Hathaway submits 
that common law exhibits a striking and problematic 
inflexibility.52  This inflexibility is the result of “path 
dependence” in the law.53 As Professor Hathaway submits, 
there are three strands of path dependence, all of which are 
relevant to the development of law:54      (1) increasing-returns 
path dependence;55 (2) evolutionary path dependence;56 and (3) 
sequencing path dependence.57  Her argument insightfully 
demonstrates that precedent is persuasive in the first sense of 
path dependence (increasing returns) because of the 
efficiencies created for the judiciary by following down the path 
laid out in earlier decisions: there is no need to reinvent the 
wheel.58 Precedent governs in the second sense of path 
dependence (evolutionary path dependence) in the sense that 
the common law exhibits a period of relative calm “punctuated” 
by short periods of rapid upheaval brought about by 
 
 49.  Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Realism of Judges Past and Present, 57 CLEV. 
ST. L. REV. 77, 91 (2009) (discussing the openness of law in U.S. legal discourse) 
[hereinafter Tamahana, RHPP]; Brian Z. Tamahana, The Distorting Slant in 
Quantitative Studies of Judging, 50 B.C. L. REV. 685, 698 (2009) (discussing the 
importance of openness of law for legal development); Richard A. Posner, Realism 
About Judges, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 577,  583 (2011) (discussing Tamahana, RHPP); 
Harry T. Edwards & Michael A. Livermore, Pitfalls of Empirical Studies that 
Attempt to Understand the Factors Affecting Appellate Decisionmaking, 58 DUKE 
L.J. 1895, 1915 (2009) (same). 
 50.  Michael E. Levine, “Law and . . .” in Theory and Practice: The USC Style 
and its Influence, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 225, 238 (2000) (linking openness to breadth 
in legal scholarship). 
 51.  Tamanaha, RHPP, supra note 49, at 91. 
 52.  Hathaway, supra note 5, at 605. 
 53.  Hathaway, supra note 5, at 605. 
 54.  Hathaway, supra note 5, at 606. 
 55.  Hathaway, supra note 5, at 606. 
 56.  Hathaway, supra note 5, at 607. 
 57.  Hathaway, supra note 5, at 608. 
 58.  Hathaway, supra note 5, at 626. 
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technological or social paradigm shifts.59  Reliance upon 
precedent also highlights the importance of the sequencing of 
decisions to achieve desired outcomes as a different order in 
which issues are brought up for decision influences the 
ultimate result:60 Hathaway demonstrates this point by 
reference to the NAACP’s strategy to overturn Plessy v. 
Ferguson culminating in Brown v. Board of Education.61  All 
three strands of path dependence have the consequence of 
“lock[ing] in” results rather than opening up legal decision-
making processes.62 
Evolutionary path dependence is most immediately 
relevant to the openness of the law.  It determines how and 
when law changes in response to the outside world.63  As 
discussed below, it is possible to improve upon Professor 
Hathaway’s account of the evolutionary path dependence in 
three ways.  First, rather than address path dependence in 
general, it is helpful to distinguish between factual openness, 
or the receptivity of the law to factual differences between the 
case at bar and precedent, and normative openness, or the 
receptivity of the law to purely normative concerns regarding 
the rule announced in precedent.64  Second, normative 
openness itself should distinguish between the normative 
openness of the law with regard to rules, standards, and 
principles.65  Third, it is important to determine whether 
openness of the law is limited only to American society or 
whether this openness is susceptible to global influences.66  
Only if the law is open to global influences does it support an 
open society.  By drawing these distinctions, it is possible to 
draw a more accurate picture of evolutionary path 
dependence.67  These distinctions further permit a normative 
 
 59.  Hathaway, supra note 5, at 641–45. 
 60.  Hathaway, supra note 5, at 645–48. 
 61.  Hathaway, supra note 5, at 648–50. 
 62.  Hathaway, supra note 5, at 650 (“Legal change is unpredictable ex ante 
and neurotic, and early outcomes may become locked in.  The law evolves 
gradually over time, drawing on an existing stock of precedence, punctuated by 
periods of rapid adaptation.  And ultimate legal outcomes depend significantly on 
the order in which decisions are made.”). 
 63.  See Hathaway, supra note 5, at 607 
 64.  See discussion infra Part I.A. 
 65.  See discussion infra Part I.B. 
 66.  See discussion infra Part I.C. 
 67.  See discussion infra Part I.C. 
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defense for the inflexibilities identified in Path Dependence in 
the Law: law must exhibit the inflexibilities identified by 
Professor Hathaway to be accountable to an open society.68  
Differently put, more openness than the law exhibits would 
tend to lead to arbitrary rule and thus deprive society of a 
means to remain open to the outside world in a sustainable 
manner.69 
A. Factual Openness 
Path Dependence in the Law does not fully address 
whether path dependence applies to the appreciation of facts 
or to formulation of norms—and how the two overlap.  
Hathaway notes instead that “[w]hat constitutes precedent in 
a particular case is a flexible concept that is subject to 
interpretation, especially when considering cases that are not 
directly on point.”70 She concludes that “courts may interpret a 
prior decision in such a way that it does not appear to be 
controlling, even though a strong argument might be made 
that it is relevant and controlling precedent” and that “[c]ourts 
may also do the opposite, citing precedent as controlling or 
persuasive precedent when that case is arguably not relevant 
to the issue at hand.”71 
One of the basic features of U.S. case law is to distinguish 
precedent from the case at bar on the basis of factual 
differences.72  Courts distinguish precedent both in the context 
of constitutional interpretation and in the context of common 
law adjudication.73  These distinctions can involve factual 
differences between precedent and the case at bar that have 
nothing to do with a change in factual circumstances.74  But 
frequently, changes in the technological, business, or social 
 
 68.  See discussion infra Part I.D. 
 69.  See discussion infra Part I.D. 
 70.  Hathaway, supra note 5, at 624. 
 71.  Hathaway, supra note 5, at 624. 
 72.  Kevin H. Smith, Practical Jurisprudence: Deconstructing and 
Synthesizing the Art and Science of Thinking Like a Lawyer, 29 U. MEM. L. REV. 
1, 16 (1998). 
 73.  Amy Coney Barrett, Precedent and Jurisprudential Disagreement, 91 
TEX. L. REV. 1711, 1732 (2013) (discussing the importance of factual distinction 
in the constitutional context); Jeremy Waldron, Stare Decisis and the Rule of Law: 
A Layered Approach, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1, 25–26 (2012) (discussing the common 
law theory of distinction). 
 74.  Waldron, supra note 73, at 25–26. 
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environment between the time when the precedent was 
decided and the time the dispute arose will prove the most 
fruitful areas of distinction.75 
Drawing such distinctions means that law is factually 
open.  Factual openness in this Article refers to a broad and 
significant factual engagement and factual sensitivity through 
an inductive lens in the judicial decision-making process.76 The 
law is not made up of absolute pronouncements but rather of 
problem solutions intended for a very specific set of disputed 
problems before the court rendering the decision upon which a 
party relies in a future case.77 A factually open judicial 
decision-making process seeks to make sense of the totality of 
facts in the context of ongoing judicial discourse.  As Martha 
Nussbaum posits, such an approach is far more Aristotelian 
(and premised in ordinary language philosophy) than 
Platonist.78  More relevantly for current purposes, it reflects 
the creed of some of the greatest American jurists such as 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes.79 
Importantly, factual openness is not a logical requirement 
of all law.  A normative system could require that the society 
it governs follow the same rules as it did before without 
consideration to factual change and in fact seek to inhibit such 
change from occurring.80  Religious laws can operate in such a 
fashion.81  Similarly, early English common law was initially 
 
 75.  Erin O’Hara, Social Constraint or Implicit Collusion?: Toward a Game 
Theoretic Analysis of Stare Decisis, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 736, 742 (1993) 
(“social, economic, or technological changes may have rendered the judge’s 
precedent obsolete”). 
 76.  See Aditi Bagchi, The Perspective of Law on Contract, 88 WASH. L. REV. 
1227, 1231 (2013) (citing BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL 
PROCESS 22–23 (1921); Arthur Corbin, What is the Common Law?, 3 AM. L. SCH. 
REV. 73, 75 (1912)). 
 77.  Mark D. Rosen & Christopher W. Schmidt, Why Broccoli? Principles and 
Popular Constitutionalism in the Health Care Cases, 61 UCLA L. REV. 66, 133 
(2013) (explaining that: “Inductive reasoning is the epistemological theory behind 
the common law’s case-by-case system”).  For a discussion of such a development 
in the law of contracts, see E. Allan Farnsworth, Contract Scholarship in the Age 
of Anthology, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1406 (1987). 
 78.  MARTHA NUSSBAUM, THE FRAGILITY OF GOODNESS: LUCK AND ETHICS IN 
GREEK TRAGEDY AND PHILOSOPHY 261–63 (2d ed., 2001) 
 79.  HOLMES, supra note 2, at 1; see also Smith, supra note 72. 
 80.  One community that has captured the popular imagination—if not 
necessarily accurately—are the Amish.  See DONALD B. KRAYBILL ET AL., THE 
AMISH (2013). 
 81.  Id. 
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hampered in its development by the rigid requirement of writ 
pleadings.82  It is thus possible to conceive of legal systems that 
are not factually open but insist upon the application of 
traditional norms in an unadulterated form.83  Consequently, 
factual openness is a particular feature of development in U.S. 
jurisprudence—if not a particularly surprising feature. 
In the context of constitutional interpretation, Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence presents a classic example of 
factual openness.84  As technology advances, both police and 
criminals will have new means to detect and commit or conceal 
crimes.85  Such advances in technology are habitually taken 
into account when courts interpret whether police conduct 
violates the Fourth Amendment rights of the accused.86  The 
relevance of such factual change as a potentially dispositive 
factor for the application of constitutional norms to specific 
circumstances means that the task of constitutional 
interpretation upon which the norm application is based is 
sensitive to change.87  It is factually open.88 
In the context of common law adjudication, contract law 
looks to changes in facts as part of its analysis of good faith and 
fair dealing.89  The specific requirements of what constitutes 
fair dealing is not set as a matter of law.90  Rather, it looks to 
the conduct of similarly situated actors in the same business 
community.91  A change in the business practices by the 
 
 82.  G. Edward White, The Intellectual Origins of Torts in America, 86 YALE 
L. J. 671, 672 (1977) (discussing the arbitrary consequences of writ pleading 
leading to its ultimate abandonment). 
 83.  O’Hara, supra note 75. 
 84.  Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth 
Amendment, 125 HARV. L. REV. 476, 485–87 (2011). 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  Id. at 525–42. 
 87.  Id. at 487. 
 88.  See id. at 491 (“The principles layer of Fourth Amendment doctrine is 
sufficiently open-textured to support a wide range of outcomes.”). 
 89.  Robert S. Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith – Its Recognition 
and Conceptualization, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 810, 818–21 (1982); Steven J. 
Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 
94 HARV. L. REV. 369 (1980); Emily Houh, The Doctrine of Good Faith in Contract 
Law: A (Nearly) Empty Vessel?, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 1 (2005); Thomas A. Diamond 
& Howard Fess, Proposed Standard for Evaluating When the Covenant of Good 
Faith and Fair Dealing Has Been Violated: A Framework for Resolving the 
Mystery, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 585 (1996). 
 90.  See Kerr, supra note 84. 
 91.  Alan D. Miller & Ronen Perry, Good Faith Performance, 98 IOWA L. REV. 
689, 690–95 (2013). 
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relevant actors can be dispositive of whether a party to a 
contract acted consistently with the duty of good faith and fair 
dealing.92  The relevance of such factual change as a potentially 
dispositive factor for common law adjudication means that 
common law adjudication, too, is factually open or sensitive to 
change. 
Factual openness practiced in the context of constitutional 
interpretation and common law adjudication is the first 
modality of how U.S. law reacts to change and develops.93  Such 
factual openness requires that courts begin with precedent and 
then consider the factual changes in circumstance between the 
case at bar and relevant precedent in pronouncing upon the 
rights of current litigants.94  This permits jurisprudence to 
“develop” or change alongside social, economic, or technological 
changes in civil society at large. 
B. Normative Openness 
Factual openness is only the first step.  Factual openness 
does not consider directly whether and how legal norms 
themselves are open.95  In considering legal development, it is 
particularly relevant to ask whether factual openness entails 
normative openness.  After asking that question, one next 
needs to inquire whether U.S. law is normatively open above 
and beyond these implications of factual openness.96 
Normative openness changes perspectives compared to 
factual openness.  It does not concern the manner of norm 
application, as such.  Rather, normative openness concerns the 
manner and degree to which the substance of law itself is open 
to external norm change.97  As discussed below, such normative 
 
 92.  Id. 
 93.  See Hathaway, supra note 5, at 659 (“As has been discussed at length, 
path dependence theory suggests that stare decisis can lead to the maintenance 
of a legal principle that is outdated and inefficient.”)  Professor Hathaway does 
not argue that law is not factually open – rather that it frequently is not open 
enough. 
 94.  Hathaway, supra note 5, at 624–25. 
 95.  Waldron, supra note 73 at 25–26. 
 96.  In Professor Hathaway’s terminology, this question addresses the 
modalities of path-dependence for U.S. law.  Hathaway, supra note 5, at 623–25. 
 97.  See Brian Z. Tamanaha, Understanding Legal Realism, 87 TEX. L. REV. 
731, 732 (2009) (“Realism refers to an awareness of the flaws, limitations, and 
openness of law—an awareness that judges must sometimes make choices, that 
they can manipulate legal rules and precedents, and that they can be influenced 
by their political and moral views and by their personal biases (the skeptical 
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openness theoretically can attach rules, standards, and 
principles.98  Normative openness on the rule level is 
narrowest.99  Normative openness on the principle level would 
be complete normative openness.100  Between narrow and 
complete normative openness, a legal tradition could be 
normatively open as to both rules and standards but not 
principles.101 
1. Narrow Normative Openness – Rules 
Legal rules are the most immediate form of prescription.102  
Legal rules provide specific instructions for decision-making by 
inquiring into a narrow class of facts to determine 
compliance.103  One typical example of a legal rule is the speed 
limit.104  The legal rule that an automobile has to travel at 55 
miles per hour or less breaks into cognizable hard elements—
is a vehicle a car?105 Did its speed exceed 55 miles per hour?106 
Narrow normative openness means that the law is open to 
a change in rules.  Such normative openness is narrow because 
rules in most instances do not provide their own rationale.107  
Rather, they institute broader policy prescriptions in an 
immediate, cognizable, and enforceable manner.108 
Factual openness on its face implies that both 
constitutional interpretation and constitutional adjudication 
at least must be narrowly normatively open.109  On the most 
 
aspect).”). 
 98.  See discussion infra Part I.B.1-3. 
 99.  See discussion infra Part I.B.1. 
 100.  See discussion infra Part I.B.2. 
 101.  See discussion infra Part I.B.3. 
 102.  Douglas G. Baird & Robert Weisberg, Rules, Standards, and the Battle 
of the Forms: A Reassessment of § 2-207, 68 VA. L. REV. 1217, 1228 (1982) (“A 
‘rule’ . . . is a very specifically framed guide to conduct that is detailed in its 
normative content and that the lawmaker believes will directly implement his 
social or economic goals.”) 
 103.  JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 14 (2011) (discussing the age 
requirement to hold the office of U.S. president as a rule). 
 104.  Harry Surden, Structural Rights in Privacy, 60 SMU L. REV. 1605, fn. 91 
(2007) (“a speed limit is the paradigm example of a legal rule.”) 
 105.  John O. McGinnis & Steven Wasick, Law’s Algorithm, 66 FLA. L. REV. 
991, 998 (2014). 
 106.  Id. 
 107.  Id. 
 108.  Id. 
 109.  See Waldron, supra note 73, at 25–26 (discussing distinctions on the basis 
of new facts). 
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basic level, new facts will have to be added to rules.110  Factual 
openness requires the rule itself to change in both precision 
and scope.  In fact, this is what most legal theorists mean when 
they say that the common law constantly evolves.111 
In the case of our speed limit example, it may someday be 
necessary to refine the definition of the speed limit when flying 
cars are mass produced to account for speed while driving on 
the highway, as opposed to speed while flying over it (a car 
flying over a highway at 120 miles an hour could violate the 
speed limit narrowly conceived but would likely be excused 
from the rule and subject to a different regulatory environment 
for airplanes).  To be open to the dispositive relevance to 
changed facts thus implies that at the very least law must be 
normatively open on the narrow level of legal rules. 
Jurisprudence confirms this implication.  In the context of 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, factual openness requires 
the development of new rules on how police must conduct 
themselves.112  Thus, the advent of new telephony technology 
requires a change in how police deal with the search of a 
smartphone.113  Prior to the change in technology in question, 
it was reasonably fair to treat a telephone as “container.”114  
Following this change in technology, this implication no longer 
can fairly be made.115  Thus, the rule for search of a mobile 
telephone or smart phone changed due to a change in facts. 
The same change is apparent in the context of common law 
adjudication.  For instance, it was at one point negligent for a 
driver not to exit his or her vehicle when approaching a railway 
crossing, look to both sides, confirm that no train was 
 
 110.  See Waldron, supra note 73, at 25–26.  
 111.  See, e.g., Michel Rosenfeld, The Rule of Law and the Legitimacy of 
Constitutional Democracy, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 1307, 1338–39 (2001) (ascribing 
unpredictability in the common law to “constantly evolving common law 
standards”); Frank Patrick Hubbard, The Nature and Impact of the “Tort Reform” 
Movement, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 437, 463–64 (2006) (stating as a starting point 
for judicial reforms of tort law that “tort law as primarily a matter of common 
law, and like any area of common law, was constantly evolving.”);Amnon Lehavi, 
Judicial Review of Judicial Lawmaking, 96 MINN. L. REV. 520, fn. 35 (2011) 
(noting the dynamism of common law evolution in England and the United States 
at the time of the founding of the United States). 
 112.  See Kerr, supra note 84, at 525–42. 
 113.  Riley v. California, 134 S.Ct. 2473, 2484–85 (2014). 
 114.  Id. at 2489 (looking to the “immense storage capacity” with “a standard 
capacity of 16 gigabytes” as part of its privacy analysis). 
 115.  See id. at 2489–91.  
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approaching the crossing, only then to continue driving.116  
Technological change has made this rule obsolete.117 
Narrow normative openness is the second modality in how 
U.S. law reacts to change or develops.  It means that courts 
change legal rules in light of changed factual circumstances.  
In fashioning a new rule, courts will look for a ready logical 
extension or change of the rule.118  Courts are frequently 
assisted in this task by scholarly articles, learned societies, and 
their sister courts in other jurisdictions who previously 
encountered related problems.119 
2. Intermediate Normative Openness – Standards 
Standards are higher order normative prescriptions than 
rules.120  Standards can require a balance of various factors to 
achieve an overall normative purpose.121  One such example is 
the reasonable person standard in the context of the tort of 
negligence.122  Standards can include a larger cluster of rules 
that give effect to the higher purpose; one such example is rules 
governing capacity in the formation of contracts, such as 
infancy, guardianship, intoxication, and duress.123 
Intermediate normative openness means that law is open 
to a change in standards.  This openness is broader than 
narrow rule-based openness because it permits a revision not 
just of a specific rule but of the rationale for rules or rationales 
of balancing.124  It is not complete because it does not permit a 
revision of the principle from which the standard itself is 
derived.125 
 
 116.  Baltimore & O.R. Co. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66, 70 (1927). 
 117.  Pokora v. Wabash Ry. Co., 292 U.S. 98, 104 (1934). 
 118.  Hathaway, supra note 5, at 623–25. 
 119.  For a discussion of such a development in the law of contracts, see E. 
Allan Farnsworth, Contract Scholarship in the Age of Anthology, 85 MICH. L. REV. 
1406 (1987). 
 120.  Baird & Weisberg, supra note 102, at 1227–28. 
 121.  Id. 
 122.  Alan D. Miller & Ronen Perry, The Reasonable Person, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
323 (2012). 
 123.  Douglas Mossman & Amanda N. Shoemaker, Incompetence to Maintain 
a Divorce Action: When Breaking Up Is Odd to Do, 84 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 117, 185 
(2010) (discussing “competence standards pertaining to formation and 
enforcement of contracts”), RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS §§ 12–16 (1981)  
(codifying the rules of capacity). 
 124.  See Baird & Weisberg, supra note 102, at 1228. 
 125.  See discussion infra Part I.B.3. 
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The application of standards can be factually open without 
being normatively open.  The standard to drive at a reasonably 
safe speed precisely will take into account all facts that are 
relevant to safety.126  It will thus impose different speeds for 
different circumstances.127  It will do so because these different 
circumstances impact the balance of whether a speed in a 
particular vehicle will unreasonably increase the risk of 
accidents, etc.128  Factual openness in the application of 
standards does not imply an openness with regard to the 
standard itself.129  Thus, facts do not change what the standard 
measures (such as, for instance, risk of accidents).130  It just 
affects the results of standard application (such as the fact that 
the presence of new technology may permit the same driver to 
go at a higher rate of speed safely without increasing accident 
risk).131 
For a standard to be normatively open, the standard itself 
needs to be subject to change due to external influence.132  For 
instance, heavy congestion could lead to the application of a 
driving standard that does not look to the safety of the driving 
as the relevant measure but the risk of congestion driving 
practices cause.  Congestion then would change what we 
measure and require drivers to drive unsafely in certain 
circumstances to reduce the overall risk of congestion brought 
about by safe driving. 
The typical manner in which a standard would be subject 
to change is for community expectations to have changed 
drastically since the introduction of the original standard.133  
 
 126.  McGinnis & Wasick, supra note 105, at 996. 
 127.  McGinnis & Wasick, supra note 105, at 996. 
 128.  See McGinnis & Wasick, supra note 105, at 996. 
 129.  See McGinnis & Wasick, supra note 105, at 996. 
 130.  See McGinnis & Wasick, supra note 105, at 996. 
 131.  McGinnis & Wasick, supra note 105, at 996.  (“[W]e can imagine in the 
not-too-distant future an app on the dashboard that would take account of 
relevant factors such as weather condition and traffic—information that is itself 
gathered by the information technology of networked monitors—and provide a 
recommended speed limit in real time. The prediction would be based on previous 
cases about how judges would apply a standard of reasonable speed under those 
circumstances.”). 
 132.  See Hathaway, supra note 5, at 654 (identifying “a factor that courts 
should take into account as they determine the degree of deference to be granted 
to prior decisions.”) 
 133.  See, e.g., MELVIN EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 73–74 
(1988) (tracking the relationship between rule establishment and relevant 
community norms in the common law in the context of the example of McPherson 
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In the common law of contracts, a representative standard 
shift occurred in the middle of the 20th century away from the 
standard of caveat emptor towards the standard of reasonable 
fair dealing.134 
Common law standard shifts are frequently influenced by 
non-state actors such as learned societies.135  For example, the 
American Law Institute, through its Restatements of Law, 
frequently brings about standard change in light of perceived 
community needs.136  One of the most famous examples of such 
a standard change is the introduction in the Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts of Promissory Estoppel in Section 90.137  
Another famous example concerns the introduction and 
development of the law of third party beneficiaries between the 
Restatement (First) of Contracts and the Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts by Arthur Corbin.138 
In the constitutional context, the normative openness of 
standards is highly controversial.139  The very point of 
originalist constitutional interpretation is to foreclose the 
 
v. Buick Motor Co.) 
 134.  Nicola W. Palmieri, Good Faith Disclosures Required During 
Precontractual Negotiations, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 70, 76 (1993) (discussing the 
trend away from caveat emptor towards a precontractual good faith standard); 
Thomas A. Wiseman Jr., What Doth the Lord Require of Thee?, 27 TEX. TECH. L. 
REV. 1403, 1404 (1996) (“There was a time in the law when we had a doctrine of 
caveat emptor—‘let the buyer beware.’  The law simply said that it was not the 
place of government to hold the buyer’s hand in the marketplace.  The day of 
caveat emptor has been replaced by the age of consumerism and Ralph Nader 
and his raiders.”). 
 135.  The fairness turn away from caveat emptor for instance was heavily 
influenced by academics such as Karl Llewellyn.  Chad DeVeaux, Trapped in 
Amber: State Common Law, Employee Rights, and Federal Enclaves, 77 BROOK 
L. REV. 499, 499 (2012). 
 136.  See Zechariah Chafee, Privileged Communications: Is Justice Served or 
Obstructed by Closing the Doctor’s Mouth on the Witness Stand?, 52 YALE L.J. 
607, 616 (1943) (noting the “powerful influence of the American Law Institute” in 
the context of uniform law projects). 
 137.  Marco J. Jimenez, The Many Faces of Promissory Estoppel: An Empirical 
Analysis under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 57 UCLA L. REV. 669 
(2010) (reviewing the reception of section 90 of Restatement (Second) by the 
courts). 
 138.  Anthony Jon Waters, The Property in the Promise: A Study of the Third 
Party Beneficiary Rule, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1169–72 (1985) (discussing 
Corbin’s contribution to the drafting of Restatement (Second) of Contracts and its 
later influence on jurisprudence). 
 139.  See John O. McGinnis, Foreign to Our Constitution, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 
303, 306 (2006); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 
849, 852–64 (1989). 
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normative malleability of standards.140  Originalism maintains 
that constitutional standards must be normatively faithful to 
the time of their drafting.141 Depending upon the originalist 
author, standards further would have to be read in such a 
fashion as to limit judicial discretion as much as possible.142 
Other schools of constitutional interpretation vigorously 
contest both claims.143 
Ultimately, much of the debate may appear to create a far 
more impressive obstacle to openness because the application 
of standards is factually open.144  How various standards are 
met and what rules they imply in the context of a given society 
obviously changes.145  In other words, it would be humorous to 
suggest that the Second Amendment protects the right to carry 
frontloading muskets only rather than updated forms of 
armament.146  But in applying the original standard faithfully 
to new circumstances, new rules that address an unforeseen 
context will have to be established.147  Most of the practical 
controversy centers on the question of whether a specific rule 
establishment is appropriate—a question that does not have to 
involve a change in standards at all but could stop at the 
earlier point of how an existing standard ought to be applied to 
a particular case.148 
The purpose of government in accordance with a written 
constitution—as opposed to an unwritten constitution—
precisely seeks to achieve closure with regard to the normative 
standards of constitutional government themselves.149  
 
 140.  See Thomas B. Colby, The Sacrifice of the New Originalism, 99 GEO. L.J. 
713, 724–28 (2011) (summarizing scholarship of old and new originalists on 
constitutional standards). 
 141.  Id. 
 142.  Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 
599, 602 (2004) (“originalism was thought to limit the discretion of the judge”). 
 143.  See id. 
 144.  See discussion supra Part I.A. 
 145.  See Darrell A.H. Miller, Text, History, and Tradition: What the Seventh 
Amendment Can Teach Us About the Second, 122 YALE L.J. 852 (2013).  
 146.  Id. at 919 (“Conversely, pitching the abstraction too narrowly risks the 
near-’frivolous’ argument that only muskets and black powder count as “arms,” 
or that hanging a gun above the mantle is the only type of ‘keep[ing]’ that 
counts.”) (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 582 (2008)). 
 147.  See Kerr, supra note 84, at 525–42 (discussing this process in the context 
of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence). 
 148.  See Kerr, supra note 84, at 525–42. 
 149.  See Douglas G. Smith, Fundamental Rights and the Fourteenth 
Amendment: The Nineteenth Century Understanding of “Higher” Law, 3 TEX. 
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Providing a written constitution signifies that a society at its 
founding seeks to provide a marker for the constitutional 
standards according to which it seeks to govern itself in the 
future—or, in the terms of the late John Rawls (the leading 
liberal political theorist of the 20th Century), the very act of 
social contracting means something.150  A normative opening 
of these standards themselves—as distinguished from the 
application of these standards to new circumstances—is an 
effective change in the constitutive order of civil society.151  It 
is a change to constitutional order rather than application of 
constitutional order.152  These changes will have to perform in 
accordance with the requisite means of constitutional change 
set out in the document itself or risk effacing the form of 
constitutional government enshrined in the original 
document.153 
This is of course not to say that constitutional law is 
immune from fundamental shifts in application that would 
tend to exceed simple rule changes.154  Rule changes in fact can 
gain critical mass or aggregate to a tipping point at which a 
previous understanding of a constitutional standard is simply 
no longer tenable—the standard and the rules applying it have 
come to deviate in such a radical manner that the standard 
requires reinterpretation.155  Such occurrences are 
 
REV. L. & POL. 225, 240–43 (1999) (arguing that the choice of adopting a written 
constitution was a meaningful one).  Many scholars supporting a dynamic reading 
of the constitution disagree with this assessment both as a matter of the historical 
accuracy and methodology.  See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN 
CONSTITUTION 1 (2012) (making the case for an unwritten constitution behind 
the written one); Todd E. Pettys, The Myth of the Unwritten Constitution, 84 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 991, 998–1000 (2009) (discussing both the historical and 
methodological reasons for a dynamic interpretation). 
 150.  See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 120–21 (1972). 
 151.  This form of interpretation falls between “skyscraper originalism” and 
“framework originalism” because it does not completely lock in meaning at the 
time of drafting of the constitution.  JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 22–23 
(2011).  This Article admits that constitutional standards were intended at the 
time of the drafting of the constitution to be expanded in a factually open manner.  
But it does not limit normative cloture to principles and instead applies a stop at 
the standard level. 
 152.  See id. 
 153.  U.S. CONST., art. V. 
 154.  See Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the 
Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045, 1051 (2001) (“We are in the 
middle of a paradigm shift that has changed the way that people write, think, 
and teach about American constitutional law.”) 
 155.  Adeno Addis, The Concept of Critical Mass in Legal Discourse, 29 
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commonplace in the development of any mature constitutional 
jurisdiction.156  The point is that even in this setting, a 
constitutional standard is never subject to outright 
replacement.157  It can only be reinterpreted.158  Such 
interpretation is backward looking as much as it is present-
concerned.159  It seeks to interpret historical text and deploys 
techniques to close the gap between the present day reality and 
the historicity of text.160  Such interpretation cannot put aside 
the historical text and apply a standard that seems more 
prudent and well-adapted to present circumstances without 
textual analysis.161  In fact, it may well be necessary to apply 
what one deems an inferior standard in those circumstances—
a consequence that the common law faced with similar 
circumstances would cheerfully be able to avoid. 
Intermediate normative openness in common law 
adjudication is the third modality of how U.S. law reacts to 
change or develops.  The choice of a written constitution should 
entail that constitutional interpretation is not normatively 
open at the standard level. 
3. Complete Normative Openness – Principles 
Principles are the highest order normative prescriptions 
in U.S. law.162  Principles codify the highest order normative 
abstraction giving cohesion to multiple standards.163  U.S. law 
has more than one such principle.164 
Complete normative openness means that law is open to 
 
CARDOZO L. REV. 97 (2007). 
 156.  See Alberto Vespaziani, Comparison, Translation and the Making of a 
Common European Constitutional Culture, 9 GERMAN L.J. 547, 573 (2008) 
(discussing constitutional paradigm shifts from a European perspective). 
 157.  BALKIN, supra note 151, at 15 (“Constitutional doctrines created by 
courts, and institutions and practices created by the political branches, flesh out 
and implement the constitutional text and underlying principles.  But they are 
not supposed to replace them.”) 
 158.  BALKIN, supra note 151, at 10–11. 
 159.  Francis J. Mootz, The Ontological Basis of Legal Hermeneutics: A 
Proposed Model of Inquiry Based on the Work of Gadamer, Habermas, and 
Ricoeur, 68 B.U. L. REV. 523, 534–39 (1988) (discussing interpretation as fusion 
of the horizon of the past context of the text with the present context of its 
reception). 
 160.  Id. 
 161.  BALKIN, supra note 151, at 10–15. 
 162.  See BALKIN, supra note 151, at 6, 14. 
 163.  See BALKIN, supra note 151, at 6, 14. 
 164.  BALKIN, supra note 151, at 6. 
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change in principles.  Such a change in principles would 
require a fundamental change in the law at a higher order than 
even a change in standards.165 
One might surmise that normative openness of standards 
implies a normative openness of principles.  When standards 
change due to normative openness, this means that principles 
governing the area of law in question lose cohesive strength.166  
But shifts in standards may operate by analogy to existing 
legal principles governing different fact patterns and do not 
necessarily create new principles.167  As a general rule 
therefore, principles, too are factually open and subject to 
change and adaption. 
Principles are not normatively open in either the common 
law or constitutional adjudication.  Constitutional principles 
have to be fixed for the constitutional document to have any 
residual meaning.168  In the context of the common law, a 
change in principle would upset significant reliance interests 
on the part of civil society relying upon an application of 
existing principles rather than the invention of new 
principles.169  A change in principle would lack democratic 
legitimacy given the function of the judiciary in the 
constitutional structure.170  A change in principle due to 
outside influence therefore is to go one step too far. 
C. Global Openness 
Global openness has two separate elements.  One asks 
whether factual and normative openness operate differently 
with regard to outside stimuli simply because they are 
foreign.171  The second element asks how openness 
 
 165.  BALKIN, supra note 151, at 6. 
 166.  See William J. Wagner, The Contractual Reallocation of Procreative 
Resources and Parental Rights: The Natural Endowment Critique, 41 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 1, 148 fn. 656 (1990) (“Theoretically, the principle of individual 
autonomy also has a corresponding tendency to erode the Lockean natural justice 
foundation of individual dignity that is implicitly necessary to validate freedom 
of contract.”). 
 167.  Hathaway, supra note 5, at 628. 
 168.  BALKIN, supra note 151, at 23. 
 169.  Levin, supra note 18, at 1038. 
 170.  Levin, supra note 18, at 1038. 
 171.  See Roger P. Alford, In Search of a Theory for Constitutional 
Comparativism, 52 UCLA L. REV. 639, 709–10 (2005) (discussing four 
fundamental ways in which use of foreign law is inconsistent with political 
democracy at least in the context of constitutional adjudication). 
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substantively engages the world at large—i.e., whether 
openness is not just a question of how constitutional 
adjudication and the common law operate but whether 
openness substantively is one of the goals of constitutional 
adjudication and the common law.172 
1. Global Implications of Factual and Normative 
Openness 
The distinction between a global and a national openness 
is ill-considered.  Factual openness follows social events and 
not the other way around.173  Normative openness similarly 
does not distinguish between domestic and global sources.174 
In the context of constitutional interpretation, narrow 
normative openness can occur by reference to foreign 
rulemaking efforts involving similar factual problems in the 
same way as it borrows from other domestic sources.175  For 
example, concerns over the criminal punishment of minors are 
not unique to the United States.176 Taking into account foreign 
experiences in their rulemaking to deal with new juvenile 
crime thus could be instructive to anticipate problems.177  To 
exclude such possibilities simply because of the source of 
factually relevant experience—foreign material as opposed to 
material from the several states—is shortsighted to the 
doctrinarian extreme.178 
In the context of common law adjudication, intermediate 
 
 172.  See Addis, supra note 3, at 948 (“[T]he exclusion of some traditions or 
experiences, in the name of a neutral (read: dominant) tradition, even if, as I shall 
show later, it is done in the name of either the rational individual agent or the 
rational community, from the discursive domain leads at best to a partial 
understanding of reality, and at worst to the transformation of the excluded into 
the deviant Other to be managed and dominated.”). 
 173.  See discussion supra  Part I.B.1. 
 174.  Ronald Krotoszynski, The Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle and the 
Challenge of Resisting – Or Engaging – Transnational Constitutional Law, 66 
ALA. L. REV. 105, 107 (2014) (“In a modern, globalized society, knowledge is viral, 
and once caught, cannot be easily shed.”). 
 175.  See Madhavi Sunder, Enlightened Constitutionalism, 37 CONN. L. REV. 
891, 905 (2005). 
 176.  Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830 (1988); see also Po-Jen Yap, 
Transnational Constitutionalism in the United States: Toward a Worldwide Use 
of Interpretive Modes of Comparative Reasoning, 39 U.S.F.L. REV. 999, 1029-1030 
(2005). 
 177.  See Alford, supra note 171, at 710. 
 178.  Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 859, 868 fn. 4 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
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normative openness can easily import foreign standards in the 
same way as it imports standards from other municipal 
sources such as the American Law Institute.179  In fact, there 
is no cognizable problem for parties to rely upon the UCP 
principles to govern their dealings in documentary letters of 
credit—and the experience of adjudication applying the UCP 
can meaningfully inform the formulation of standards in the 
context of UCC Article 5.180 
The distrust of foreign sources appears to be that the use 
of foreign materials would per se import alien principles and as 
such introduce complete normative openness through the 
backdoor.181  This distrust is ill-founded as standards can be 
imported without importing the source principle to which they 
belong.182  The foreign standard can be “translated” in the same 
sense that any literary text can be translated.183  While the 
translation loses part of the meaning of the original—
Commedia Dell’Arte in Italian is not Commedia Dell’Arte in 
English—it still faithfully connects the insight of foreign 
material to an ongoing domestic discourse—Commedia 
Dell’Arte in English influenced Shakespeare without 
transforming Shakespeare into an Italian author.184  The same 
translation can and does occur in the field of legal standards. 
In short, Justice Scalia’s now-famous conclusion that the 
development of U.S. constitutional interpretation has to occur 
without reference to contemporary foreign legal sources 
 
 179.  See Kirsten David Adams, The Folly of Uniformity? Lessons from the 
Restatement Movement, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 423, 443–45 (2004) (discussing the 
reasons for the influence of the ALI’s restatements of law). 
 180.  James E. Byrne, Contracting out of Revised UCC Article 5 (Letters of 
Credit), 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 297 (2006). 
 181.  See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 859, 868 fn. 4 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
 182.  Gregory Shaffer, Globalization and Social Protection: The Impact of EU 
and International Rules in the Ratcheting Up of U.S. Privacy Standards, 25 YALE 
J. INT’L L. 1, 38 (2000) (“[I]t is misleading simply to segregate the foreign from 
the domestic, the external from the internal.  In importing and exporting goods 
and services, countries can also import standards and procedures.”). 
 183.  See Cynthia Soohoo & Suzanne Stolz, Bringing Theories of Human 
Rights Change Home, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 459, 476 (2008) (discussing 
translation of human rights norms into the domestic context). 
 184.  See Frances K. Barasch, Hamlet Versus Commedia dell’Arte, in 
SHAKESPEARE AND RENAISSANCE LITERARY THEORIES: ANGLO-ITALIAN 
TRANSACTIONS 105, 107 (Michele Marrapodi ed., 2011) (discussing the influence 
of the Commedia Dell’Arte on Shakespeare). 
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overreaches.185  It is concerned with an inappropriate 
malleability of standards or principles occasioned by the use of 
foreign materials.186  As foreign materials can be used to inform 
rulemaking consistent with existing constitutional standards, 
Justice Scalia’s criticism simply is not warranted.187 
2. Substantive Openness 
This leaves the question whether the openness of 
constitutional interpretation and common law adjudication 
serves as a substantive goal above and beyond its role as an 
operational modality of legal change.188  In such a case, 
openness would not just be a modality of legal change.189  
Openness would be a substantive goal in the same way as 
increasing prosperity of civil society or increasing its political 
freedoms.190 
Both factual and normative openness strongly suggest 
that the openness of U.S. law is not an accident; it is part of its 
inherent design.191  Thus, factual openness suggests that law 
continually seeks to adapt itself to its surroundings rather 
than forcing surroundings to fit outdated legal commands.192  
Normative openness further suggests a willingness on the part 
of courts not just to consider factual circumstances in rule 
application, but to incorporate factual circumstance into norm 
creation.193  Both factual and normative openness suggest a 
positive attitude towards accommodating change in the outside 
world. 
Jurisprudence suggests that both constitutional 
interpretation and common law adjudication treat inclusion as 
a goal in its own right.  Civil rights jurisprudence over time 
extends the class of right holders.  Cases which refuse to do so, 
Dred Scott and Korematsu chief among them, are considered 
 
 185.  Antonin Scalia, Foreign Legal Authority in Federal Courts, 98 AM. SOC’Y 
INT’L L. PROC. 305, 307 (2004). 
 186.  See McGinnis, supra note 139, at 306–07. 
 187.  See discussion supra Part I.B.1. 
 188.  See W. Michael Reisman, Myth System and Operational Code, 3 YALE 
STUD. W. PUB. ORDER 230 (1977) (discussing the difference between myth 
systems, operational codes, and the substantive goals of operational codes). 
 189.  Id. 
 190.  See discussion infra Parts II and III. 
 191.  See discussion supra Parts I.A and I.B. 
 192.  See discussion supra Part I.A. 
 193.  See discussion supra Part I.B. 
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not just morally objectionable but a result of legal error.194  In 
the realm of common law adjudication, doctrinal expansions of 
quasi-contract similarly extend rights-based regimes to those 
left without legislative protection for instance in the family law 
context.195  In this sense, both constitutional interpretation and 
common law adjudication insist on expanding outwards 
through substantive openness rather than retreating into 
formal shells.196  Such substantive openness means that U.S. 
law looks for opportunities to reach out; choosing between two 
alternatives, one inclusive and one exclusive, U.S. law seeks to 
be inclusive. 
D. Openness and Evolutionary Path Dependence 
The normative goal of openness laid out in this section 
provides a justification for the evolutionary path dependence 
described by Professor Hathaway.197  She notes first that legal 
evolution does not reach “[a]n equilibrium—a single efficient 
outcome”198 because even if such an outcome were to exist, “the 
adaptive rate of historical processes may proceed more slowly 
than changes in the environment, leading to a perpetual lag 
and, therefore, to a perpetual disparity between the institution 
or rule and its environment.”199 Professor Hathaway further 
argues that “the evolution of the common law occurs 
 
 194.  Scheindlin & Schwartz, supra note 16, at 841; David A. Harris, On the 
Contemporary Meaning of Korematsu: “Liberty Lies in the Hearts of Men and 
Women,” 76 MO. L. REV. 1, 9-10 (2011) (“For example, Justice Antonin Scalia 
ranked Korematsu among the worst decisions that the Supreme Court ever made, 
comparing it to the universally despised Dred Scott case, which helped plunge the 
nation into the Civil War.  With the other justices opining about the case either 
in decisions or during their confirmation hearings, eight of the current justices of 
the Supreme Court have said that courts could not rely on the core principle of 
Korematsu today.”)  But see Michael Halley, Breaking the Law in America, 19 
LAW & LITERATURE 471, 477 (2007) (“The judgments in Dredd Scott, Plessy v. 
Ferguson, and Korematsu v. U.S confirm that yesterday’s best answers are 
sometimes today’s worst ones.  Nor is anyone in a position to say how future 
generations will evaluate today’s judgments about what is right and what is 
wrong.”); Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379, 406–11, 422–27 
(2011) (recontextualizing both Dred Scott and Korematsu in then current 
jurisprudence and noting the cases’ consistency with that jurisprudence). 
 195.  Judy Beckner Sloan, Quantum Meruit: Residual Equity in Law, 42 
DEPAUL L. REV. 399, 423–24 (1992). 
 196.  See Wood v. Lucy, 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917). 
 197.  Hathaway, supra note 5, at 635–45. 
 198.  Hathaway, supra note 5, at 640. 
 199.  Hathaway, supra note 5, at 640. 
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sporadically” with “[l]ong periods of stasis . . . followed by rapid 
change . . . or ‘punctuation.’ ” 200  This “indicates the central 
importance of the brief but crucial punctuations that open up 
windows of opportunity for sweeping change.”201  She further 
notes that “the periods between punctuations are 
characterized by gradual change” that is comparatively 
insignificant.202  Hathaway raises as the key normative 
problem that constitutional law in particular is an area with 
significantly fewer punctuations and that constitutional law in 
particular is thus (potentially) significantly “out of sync with 
societal conditions.”203 
The distinction between normative openness on the 
standard level and the rule level similarly explains the 
different rates of evolutionary change noted by Professor 
Hathaway.204  There is the day-to-day gradual change of the 
common law that is accounted for by rule change.205  But the 
common law is also subject to much more far-reaching 
normative shifts coalescing in much shorter periods of time—
resembling paradigm shifts in scientific disciplines.206  This 
second change occurs when standards shift, meaning that it is 
a different kind of change responding to a different, more 
fundamental type of normative openness of the common law.207 
The distinction confirms that legal development must lag 
behind social development.208  Law changes on the rule level as 
a result of factual openness.209  This in turn means that the 
factual societal change precedes the change in the law.210  
Facts, in other words, are always embedded in a framework 
that is half a step behind social and economic change.  While 
decisions gradually move this framework, the movement is 
stopped short of complete overlap because new rules still 
 
 200.  Hathaway, supra note 5, at 641. 
 201.  Hathaway, supra note 5, at 642. 
 202.  Hathaway, supra note 5, at 643. 
 203.  Hathaway, supra note 5, at 655–56. 
 204.  Hathaway, supra note 5, at 641–45. 
 205.  Hathaway, supra note 5, at 641–45. 
 206.  For a discussion of Kuhn’s philosophy of science in the legal context, see 
Steven L. Winter, Indeterminacy and Incommensurability in Constitutional Law, 
78 CAL. L. REV. 1441,1447–53 (1990). 
 207.  See discussion supra Part I.B.2. 
 208.  See Hathaway, supra note 5, at 640. 
 209.  See discussion supra Part I.B.1. 
 210.  See discussion supra Part I.B.1. 
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rationalize old standards.211  Before reaching a social tipping 
point when either a critical mass of rules falling under a 
standard are so changed as to make the standard untenable or 
social change itself has made the standard untenable, law is by 
definition inefficient.212  This inefficiency does not present a 
normative problem precisely because it moves towards a 
considered and organic integration of new circumstances.  To 
do so in a sustainable and predictable way, law must give its 
development time to integrate and appropriately digest. 
The conclusion that constitutional law is normatively 
closed at the standard level further confirms that observation 
that constitutional law has fewer punctuations than the 
common law.213  This is desirable precisely because of the 
meaning of adopting a written constitution.214  This written 
constitution freezes standards in order to achieve value other 
than efficiency or accommodate norms other than intuitive 
claims of social inequity.  These norms are described by the 
other dimensions of development. 
II. PROSPERITY 
The second dimension of development is prosperity.  This 
dimension gives law height.215  At its core, the second 
dimension of development posits that law develops in order to 
protect and foster the prosperity of those whom it governs.216  
Prosperity, in the form of economic growth, is a typical 
measure of development in the context of social science 
literature.217 It is therefore unsurprising that it would be 
 
 211.  See discussion supra Part I.B.1–2. 
 212.  Addis, supra note 155. 
 213.  See Hathaway, supra note 5, at 656. 
 214.  See discussion supra Part I.B.2. 
 215.  “Height of prosperity” is a common trope used in legal writing.  See, e.g., 
James E. Clyburn, Developing the Will and the Way to Address Persistent 
Poverty in America, 51 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 7 (2014) (“In 2000, we were at the 
height of a decade of economic prosperity”); Eyal Benvenisti, Sovereigns as 
Trustees of Humanity: On the Accountability of States to Foreign Stakeholders, 
107 AM. J. INT’L L. 295, 303 (2013) (“The general prosperity attains a greater 
height, and is more widely diffused, in proportion to the amount and variety of 
the personal energies enlisted in promoting it.” (quoting JOHN STEWART MILL, 
CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 58 (1861)). 
 216.  Todd J. Zywicki, The Rule of Law, Freedom, and Prosperity, 10 SUP. CT. 
ECON. REV. 1, 22 (2003). 
 217.  See, e.g., ARCHILLES C. COSTALES ET AL., ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND 
APPLICATION 292 (2000) (“The level of income per person, i.e., gross national 
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represented in the definition of legal development, as well. 
As discussed below, there are important distinctions 
between purely economic development and development in the 
legal context.  In the legal context, prosperity is a means to an 
end rather than an end in itself.218  It fulfills a central function 
to the sustainability of legal government.219  This connection 
between prosperity and governance will be further explored in 
part III. 
The dimension of prosperity provides a normative 
rationale to anchor increasing-returns path dependence.220  As 
Professor Hathaway explains, increasing-return path 
dependence means that following the path of earlier legal 
decisions creates increasing returns for the judiciary—there is 
less effort and more precision in following precedent as 
compared to re-inventing the wheel to arrive at an original 
problem solution.221  By focusing on prosperity as a dimension 
of legal development, it becomes apparent that increasing 
return path dependence creates efficiencies not only for the 
judiciary.222  It also creates value for society at large by 
permitting property holders to plan and address risk in a 
reasonably predictable manner.223 
A. Prosperity in the Social Science Development 
Literature 
Social science literature typically defines development by 
reference to prosperity.224  Development in the first instance 
refers to the gross national income per capita of a country.225  
It further looks to the debt level of the country in question in 
light of the country’s gross domestic product.226  Development 
 
product per capita, has traditionally been used to measure the level of 
development of a particular nation.  It suggests that income is a good approximate 
measure of overall social progress.”); AGNÈS BÉNASSY-QUÉRÉ ET AL., ECONOMIC 
POLICY: THEORY AND PRACTICE 440–41 (2010) (discussing the traditional 
measure of economic progress and its critics in the social sciences). 
 218.  See discussion infra Part II.D. 
 219.  See discussion infra Part II.D. 
 220.  Hathaway, supra note 5, at 627–45. 
 221.  Hathaway, supra note 5, at 627–45. 
 222.  See discussion infra Part II.D. 
 223.  See discussion infra Part II.D. 
 224.  Addis, supra note 155. 
 225.  Addis, supra note 155. 
 226.  Punam Chuhan, Debt and Debt Indicators in the Measurement of 
Vulnerability, in FISCAL SUSTAINABILITY IN THEORY AND PRACTICE: A 
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in this context typically further refers to the standard of living 
enjoyed by the members of the society in question.227  It further 
assesses the industrial and technological base of the target 
economy.228 
This development measure further looks to technological 
advances.229  It needs to measure the increase in living 
standards brought about through technological change—for 
instance, it is part of economic growth that it is the norm for 
U.S. households to own a car today when this was not the norm 
approximately 60 years ago.230  Similarly, the increased 
availability of communications and computing technology 
provides a significant growth in prosperity by making more 
goods and services available at cheaper prices to a larger 
population.231 
Such prosperity is predominantly an economic measure.232  
It looks to a society’s wealth and its ability to produce more 
wealth.233  It is not—or at least traditionally was not—
predominantly an ethical measure.234  In part, this economic 
focus reflects the problem of arriving at a neutral and 
quantifiable ethical measure with which to assess 
development.235  Social science methodology traditionally 
required such neutral and quantifiable standards.236  It is thus 
no surprise that qualitative factors are not at the core of the 
classic social science development paradigm.237 
 
HANDBOOK 81, 94–95 (Craig Burnside ed., 2005). 
 227.  Paul Riggs, The Standard of Living in Scotland, 1800-1850, in LIVING 
STANDARDS, AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: ESSAYS IN ANTHROPOMETRIC 
HISTORY (John Komlos ed., 1994) (defining standard of living in economics 
literature). 
 228.  Fran Ansley, Standing Rusty and Rolling Empty: Law, Poverty, and 
America’s Eroding Industrial Base, 81 GEO. L.J. 1757, 1760 (1993). 
 229.  RICHARD R. NELSON, THE SOURCES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 237–39 
(1996) (addressing technological advances from an industry perspective). 
 230.  DAVID E. O’CONNOR, THE BASICS OF ECONOMICS 241 (2004). 
 231.  Sub-Saharan Africa, in ACCESS DENIED: THE PRACTICE AND POLICY OF 
GLOBAL INTERNET FILTERING 213, 213 (Ronald Deibert et al. eds., 2008) 
 232.  See supra note 21. 
 233.  See supra note 21. 
 234.  See AMARTYA SEN, COMMODITIES AND CAPABILITIES 1, 12 (1999) 
(discussing the lack of coherent definition of “utility” in economics literature) 
 235.  Id. 
 236.  See Peter Manicas, The Social Sciences Since World War II: The Rise and 
Fall of Scientism, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL SCIENCE METHODOLOGY 
7–24 (William Outhwaite & Stephen Turner eds., 2007) (summarizing the 
development of social scientific methodology). 
 237.  Id. 
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B. Prosperity in U.S. Law 
Given the predominance of the economic definition of 
development in the social sciences, it should not be surprising 
that the definition of development proposed by this Article 
similarly looks to prosperity.  Prosperity is a key component of 
standard-formation in U.S. law.238  It had significant purchase 
in the drafting of the Constitution.239  Most recently, it has 
shaped the U.S. legal experience in the second half of the 20th 
century.240 
One such evidence of the importance of prosperity to U.S. 
law and legal development is the law and economics 
movement.241  First, the very appearance of a law-and-
economics movement in the U.S. is of some significance: 
whereas European economic analysis of law led to significant 
Marxist engagement of jurisprudence,242 U.S. law and 
economics started from a “preference for markets over state 
command as a mechanism for allocating resources.”243  Even 
since these early days, this market-friendly form of law and 
economics remained a particularly American form of legal 
engagement.244  Second, the law and economics approach can 
 
 238.  Richard A. Posner, Cost-Benefit Analysis: Definition, Justification, and 
Comment on Conference Papers, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1153 (2000); Eric A. Posner, 
Economic Analysis of Contract Law After Three Decades: Success or Failure?, 112 
YALE L.J. 829 (2003). 
 239.  Clarence Thomas, Remarks, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 231, 231 (2000). 
 240.  See Stephen M. Feldman, The Supreme Court in a Postmodern World: A 
Flying Elephant, 84 MINN. L. REV. 673, 680 (2000) (“Many Americans, including 
most legal scholars and political theorists, believed throughout the 1950s that the 
nation was united in a celebration of democracy and the rule of law. Moreover, 
they were confident that because of American know-how, prosperity, and power, 
democracy and the rule of law not only could suffuse the lives of all Americans 
but also could beneficially shape the entire world.”). 
 241.  RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (7th ed., 2007). 
 242.  See RENATE HOLUB, ANTONIO GRAMSCI: BEYOND MARXISM AND 
POSTMODERNISM 43–44 (1992) (discussing Gramsci’s engagement of law through 
Marxist economics). 
 243.  Herbert Hovenkamp, The First Great Law & Economics Movement, 42 
STAN. L. REV. 993, 1056–57 (1990) 
 244.  See Thomas S. Ulen, The Unexpected Guest: Law and Economics, Law 
and Other Cognate Disciplines, and the Future of Legal Scholarship, 79 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 403, (2004) (noting that realism is a uniquely American school of 
jurisprudence and linking it to law and economics); Kristoffel Grechenig &Martin 
Gelter, The Transatlantic Divergence in Legal Thought: American Law and 
Economics vs. German Doctrinalism, 31 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 295, 
297–98 (2008) (noting the alien approach to law taken by law and economics from 
a European perspective). 
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make sense of U.S. legal phenomena that are otherwise hard 
to understand or justify.245 For example, law and economics 
has been a uniquely powerful tool in understanding the law of 
negligence,246 nuisance,247 contract law,248 the intersection 
between tort and property,249 and, perhaps less surprisingly, 
antitrust law.250  Both the very existence of this uniquely 
American school of jurisprudence and its ability accurately to 
describe U.S. law in economic terms showcases just how 
central prosperity is to the values legal development seeks to 
foster. 
Property protections enshrined in the Constitution further 
highlight the importance of economic growth to U.S. 
constitutional design.251  Takings jurisprudence in particular 
provides a mechanism that requires in theory that 
governmental action increases net prosperity rather than 
decrease it by requiring the payment of compensation to 
affected property holders for the complete destruction of their 
property rights—unless the prosperity of the commonweal 
itself depends upon not making such compensation.252 
The importance of economic wellbeing to constitutional 
design is further confirmed by the concerns foremost on the 
 
 245.  Thomas S. Ulen, Remarks, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 177, 177 (2006) 
(“advances in legal understanding that flowed from that application were huge”). 
 246.  Richard Posner, The Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 86 MICH. L. REV. 827, 
853 (1988); Richard A. Posner, Guido Calabresi’s The Cost of Accidents: A 
Reassessment, 64 MARYLAND L. REV. 12 (2005). 
 247.  Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and the Property Rules in the Law of 
Nuisance, 90 VA. L. REV. 965, 966 (2004) (citing R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social 
Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960)). 
 248.  See infra note 238. 
 249.  Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules 
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1089 
(1972). 
 250.  William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust 
Cases, 94 HARV. L. REV. 937, 937 (1981). 
 251.  Alberto B. Lopez, Weighing and Reweighing Eminent Domain’s Political 
Philosophies Post-Kelo, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 237, 252-3 (2006); Henry A. 
Span, Public Choice and the Political Utility of the Takings Clause, 40 IDAHO L. 
REV. 11, 81 (2003) (“judicial enforcement of the Takings Clause should aim at 
creating a sustainable democratic framework for debating, bargaining, and 
achieving fairness, liberty, prosperity, virtue, human fulfillment, and other 
values”). 
 252.  State v. Jacobson, 157 P. 1108, 1111 (Or. 1916); Keith H. Hirokawa, 
Property Pieces in Compensation Statutes: Law’s Eulogy For Oregon’s Measure 
37, 38 ENVT’L. L. 1111, 1133 (2008) (discussing State v. Jacobson) 
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minds of the U.S. founding generation.253  The American 
revolution was sparked in significant part by British 
impairment of American economic interests.254  The concern to 
protect economic rights was very much on the minds of the 
drafters of both the Declaration of Independence and the 
Constitution.255 
C. Prosperity v. Wealth 
Importantly, prosperity needs to be distinguished from 
wealth.  The difference between both measures is most readily 
apparent in the context of wealth disparity.256  A wealth 
measure does not distinguish how resources are distributed in 
an economy.257  A prosperity measure, on the other hand, does 
take resource distribution into account.258 
Economic and social scientific development data more and 
more takes the distinction between prosperity and wealth into 
account.259  The distinction thus is not unorthodox from the 
point of view of the classic development literature.260  But the 
prosperity/wealth distinction has a far longer pedigree in the 
constitutional context than it does in the economic or social 
scientific context, going as far back as the founding of Athenian 
democracy.261 
 
 253.  THOMAS P. SLAUGHTER, INDEPENDENCE: THE TANGLED ROOTS OF THE 
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 435 (2014). 
 254.  Id. 
 255.  Maureen B. Cavanaugh, Democracy, Equality, and Taxes, 54 ALA. L. 
REV. 415, 431–32, 456–57 (2003). 
 256.  Chris Matthews, Wealth Inequality in America: It’s Worse Than You 
Think, FORTUNE (Oct. 31, 2014), http://fortune.com/2014/10/31/inequality-
wealth-income-us/. 
 257.  JACQUELINE BRUX, ECONOMIC ISSUES AND POLICY 166 (2007). 
 258.  Sotiorios A Barber & James E. Fleming, The Canon and the Constitution 
Outside the Courts, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 267, 268–69 (2000) (noting the middle 
class, or here pejoratively bourgeois, nature of the aspiration to prosperity); 
Richard A. Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, 111 HARV. L. 
REV. 1637, 1697 (1998) (same); GARY HART, RESTORATION OF THE REPUBLIC: THE 
JEFFERSONIAN IDEAL IN 21-ST CENTURY AMERICA 195–96 (2002) (discussing the 
republican theory of wealth disparity as a threat to sustainable self-government 
without domination). 
 259.  Id. 
 260.  BRUX, supra note 257, at 166.   
 261.  VICTOR DAVIS HANSON, THE OTHER GREEKS: THE FAMILY FARM AND THE 
AGRARIAN ROOTS OF WESTERN CIVILIZATION 43 (1999) (“After all, farmers 
themselves knew the value of banding together to preserve their own hard-won 
gains against the wealthy in a no-nonsense pragmatism that in every early 
timocratic agricultural city-state checked radicalism and, eventually, the 
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From the point of view of U.S. constitutional design, the 
distinction has normative importance.  Seeking prosperity 
here does not necessarily mean that law should increase the 
gross domestic product, or gross national income, but that law 
must protect the rights and earning opportunities of the 
citizenry at large.262  Prosperity looks to maintain, foster, and 
expand a broad middle class by protecting its property rights.   
Kelo v. City of New London provides a tangible example of 
this difference.263  In Kelo, the United States Supreme Court 
sanctioned the use of eminent domain in order to condemn real 
property to apparently more efficient use by a developer.264  
This development was quickly decried as legal error.265  The 
error here is not that the decision would not prove to use 
resources more efficiently and thus support wealth creation—
the decision did exactly that.  Rather, the error was that law 
could be turned against what prosperity is meant to protect: 
the property interests of the ordinary citizen.266 
D. Prosperity and Increasing-Returns Path Dependence 
The normative goal of prosperity laid out in this section 
provides a justification for the increasing-returns path 
dependence described by Professor Hathaway.267  Increasing 
return path dependence means that the precedent fixes the 
 
excesses of both aristocracy and democracy.”) 
 262.  DAVID J. BEDERMAN, THE CLASSICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION: PREVAILING WISDOM 101 (2008) (“The Constitutions thus 
enshrined some classical notions of property ownership as being a surrogate for 
the political worth of individuals.  It is, as Madison noted in a somewhat 
unrelated context in Federalist 10 that inequality manifests itself in the ‘different 
and unequal faculties of acquiring property,’ the protection of which is the ‘first 
object of government.’ While no attempt need be made here to resurrect a purely 
economic reading of the Constitution as vindicating the interests of the propertied 
classes in America, there was a manifest understanding among the Framing 
generation that the maintenance of some forms of property qualifications for 
voting was a necessary bulwark against the degradation of republican virtues.”) 
 263.  Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
 264.  Id. at 488–89. 
 265.  Gideon Kanner, The Public Use Clause: Constitutional Mandate or 
“Hortatory Fluff”?, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 335, 336 (2006); Ilya Somin, Controlling the 
Grasping Hand: Economic Development Takings After Kelo, 15 SUP. CT. ECON. 
REV. 183, 271 (2007). 
 266.  Gideon Kanner, Kelo v. New London: Bad Law, Bad Policy, and Bad 
Judgment, 38 URB. LAW. 201, 201 (2006). 
 267.  Hathaway, supra note 5, at 627–45. 
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point of departure for legal analysis.268  This means that early 
cases first encountering an issue are comparatively more 
important in fixing the court’s jurisprudential approach than 
later disputes that arise once a path has been chosen.269  
Increasing-returns path dependence “generates significant 
self-reinforcing or adaptive expectations.”270  Problematically, 
“even when judges seek to create legal rules to advance their 
positions in the future, they are unable to predict or control 
whether their decisions will create precedents that will 
necessarily lead to particular results in future cases” because 
they cannot anticipate all future consequences of their current 
problem solutions enshrined in early case law.271  The 
inflexibility brought about by increasing-returns path 
dependence in short at first blush borders on arbitrariness 
because it can lock in economic inefficiencies and social 
inequities until such time as a broader standard shift or 
reinterpretation is brought about by cumulative 
circumstance.272 
Prosperity goes a long way to explaining why such 
inefficiencies and inequities are valuable.  As Professor 
Hathaway points out, increasing-returns path dependence 
creates reliance interests.273  These interests themselves are 
economically valuable because they protect existing property 
interests against significant upheaval and permit medium 
term planning without fear of change in law.  Current property 
interest holders thus are similarly reaping increasing returns 
from the path dependence of law because of the greater 
predictability in business environment such increasing returns 
promise. 
Increasing returns also provides a clear roadmap for social 
mobility.  While the path is difficult, it is possible to make 
investment in self-improvement that will reap comparative 
long term rewards (such as, for instance, investing in studying 
for a law degree).  While increasing returns create a gap for 
those who do not yet have the right kind of interests to benefit 
from this form of path dependence, increasing-returns path 
 
 268.  Hathaway, supra note 5, at 624. 
 269.  Hathaway, supra note 5, at 630. 
 270.  Hathaway, supra note 5, at 628. 
 271.  Hathaway, supra note 5, at 629. 
 272.  Hathaway, supra note 5, at 630–32. 
 273.  Hathaway, supra note 5, at 628. 
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dependence is of significant value to all others. 
Prosperity, in other words, is not a tool to address the 
quantitatively worst kind of income inequality.  Prosperity as 
a goal assists property-holders.274  Almost by definition, the 
poor are not a member of this class.275  The prosperity 
dimension of legal development does not immediately speak to 
their needs or interests.276  Prosperity looks to increase the 
group of property-holders through robust property protections 
and as such indirectly addresses poverty.277  But this protection 
does very little to address the intuitive area of greatest concern 
regarding income inequality—that between richest and 
poorest.278  To that group, and their champions in academic 
political theory, this dimension of legal development, standing 
alone, would simply seem unjust.279  As discussed further 
below, however, it does not stand alone. 
III. FREEDOM 
The third dimension of legal development is freedom.  
Freedom gives law depth.280 At its core, the third dimension of 
development posits that law develops in order to protect and 
foster the freedoms of those whom it governs.281 
Freedom is becoming a recognized measure of 
development in the social sciences.282  Reliance upon a freedom 
 
 274.  Arthur S. Miller, Pretense and Our Two Constitutions, 54 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 375, 384–85 (1986); BEDERMAN, supra note 262, at 99. 
 275.  See Susan Ann Silverstein, What Is Poverty?, 32-SUM HUM. RTS. 1, 22–
23 (2005). 
 276.  See id. 
 277.  See Peter Boettke et al., Takings, 8 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 327, 335 
(2010). 
 278.  See GLENN FIREBAUGH, THE NEW GEOGRAPHY OF GLOBAL INCOME 
INEQUALITY 121 (2003). 
 279.  See RAWLS, supra note 150, at 75–78 (setting out the difference principle 
that justice requires that resource distributions always favor the least 
advantaged in society). 
 280.  Gregory P. Magarian, Substantive Due Process as a Source of 
Constitutional Protection for Nonpolitical Speech, 90 MINN. L. REV. 247, 249 
(2005) (noting in the First Amendment context that “[a]n ideal regime of 
expressive freedom would protect political debate with the depth of the 
democracy-focused First Amendment paradigm while simultaneously casting a 
broad enough net to safeguard speech that substantively advances autonomy.”). 
 281.  As discussed below, this dimension is closely linked to principles of self-
government, or as Jack Balkin calls it, the principle of democracy.  BALKIN, supra 
note 103, at 15. 
 282.  SEN, supra note 23, at 3. 
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dimension of development is thus in keeping with the current 
state of social scientific research into what development must 
encompass.283  The predominant measure of freedom in the 
social sciences is the capabilities approach developed by Sen 
and Nussbaum, among others.284 While their advances are by 
no means uncontroversial, they indicate a willingness in the 
social sciences to look beyond economics.285 
Given the central importance of freedom to the rule of law, 
legal development intuitively must take freedom into account.  
It is ubiquitous as a value of development throughout U.S. 
law.286  Although the capabilities approach as such is not 
organic to U.S. law, a republican conception of freedom as non-
domination is.287  This conception of freedom is consistent with 
the capabilities approach as a metric for freedom developed in 
the social sciences.288 
By introducing freedom as a dimension of legal 
development, it is possible to explain why sequencing path 
dependence is both good and necessary.289  Absent sequencing 
path dependence, fundamental questions of social welfare 
would be locked in and not subject to change by those whom 
the law governs.290  The law itself would become a dominating 
force.291  Sequencing path dependence—and legal 
indeterminacy—thus are relevant and important to maintain 
law as much in the position of an umpire of social discourse 
rather than an empire of judicial fiats.292 
A. The Link Between Freedom, Prosperity, and Openness 
in Social Science Research 
The link between freedom and prosperity is intuitive: 
prosperity appears to provide a means to freedom and vice 
 
 283.  James M. Cypher & James L. Dietz, THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT 47 (2d ed. 2004) (discussing the introduction of the Human 
Development Index). 
 284.  See discussion infra Part III.A. 
 285.  John A. Powell, The Needs of Members in a Legitimate Democratic State, 
44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 969 (2004) (surveying the social scientific literature on 
Sen and the Human Development Index). 
 286.  See discussion infra Part III.B. 
 287.  See discussion infra Part III.C. 
 288.  See discussion infra Part III.C. 
 289.  See discussion infra Part III.D. 
 290.  See discussion infra Part III.D. 
 291.  See discussion infra Part III.D. 
 292.  See discussion infra Part III.D. 
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versa.  Nobel Prize winning economist Sen crisply posits this 
link between freedom and prosperity in Development as 
Freedom.293  Sen submits that increasing prosperity is an 
important element to increasing freedom because it limits 
income poverty.294 
The link between freedom and openness is similarly 
intuitive: an open society provides its members with more 
potential, more options to choose from and as such increases 
freedom in a meaningful way.  Sen’s capabilities approach 
again provides a helpful tool.295  A society which is open will 
increase capabilities simply by removing external obstacles a 
closed society erects.296  But again, openness alone does not 
define capabilities as a person must have the means available 
to take advantage of openness. 
While freedom, openness and prosperity are related, they 
each measure different things.  A person could be prosperous 
but not free.297  A person could live in an open society and not 
be prosperous.298  Similarly, it is not absurd to consider a 
person living in makeshift shelter and without any possessions 
free.299  But all three are plainly related and compatible. 
Sen’s and Nussbaum’s work has moved the social-science 
development discourse away from a purely economic model to 
a capabilities model.300  As Sen argues, a purely economic 
model is insufficient to measure development for two reasons.  
First, income does not alone determine whether a person can 
participate in self-governing processes.  In other words, income 
does not address the institutions governing society.  Second, 
income does not alone determine what opportunities are in fact 
going to be open to the respective members of society.301  In 
other words, income does not address what kind of lives 
 
 293.  SEN, supra note 23, at 14. 
 294.  SEN, supra note 23, at 87. 
 295.  SEN, supra note 23, at 72–86. 
 296.  SEN, supra note 23, at 245–46. 
 297.  See Reed Elizabeth Loder, Integrity and Epistemic Passion, 77 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 841, 885 (2002) (discussing “golden handcuffs” in legal practice). 
 298.  Cf. John Calmore, Race/ism Lost and Found: The Fair Housing Act at 
Thirty, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1067, 1973 (1998) (noting that “ghetto poor are really 
removed from open society”). 
 299.  See Kwame Anthony Appiah, Global Citizenship, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2375, 2375–76 (2007) (relaying the story of the encounter of Diogenes and 
Alexander). 
 300.  SEN, supra note 23, at 74–76. 
 301.  SEN, supra note 23, at 74–76. 
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members of society could actually choose to live. 
To address both concerns, Sen and Nussbaum develop an 
approach that looks to the impact of society on the capabilities 
of members of society: 
The CA [capabilities approach] begins, then, from a very 
simple question: What are people really able to do and to 
be?  “Capabilities” are the answer to that question: people’s 
real opportunities for functioning and choice.  (Sen calls 
capabilities “substantive freedoms.”)  Proponents of a CA 
hold that each and every person matters: this is what 
Nussbaum has called the “principle of each person as end.”  
In other words, it is not enough to secure capabilities to a 
region, or a group, or even a family.  The approach asks how 
each and every person is doing, and its goal is the 
empowerment of each.302 
As social science research relying upon Sen and Nussbaum 
has shown, development is not a purely economic measure.303  
To speak of the development impact of law does not look to 
purely economic indicators.304  To say that law is inefficient, 
i.e., that it leads to an economically sub-optimal result, does 
not mean that the law is detrimental to development.305  It is 
not even to say that a different mode of governance would 
improve development.  It simply says that law values a certain 
kind of inefficiency and provides a metric to determine whether 
this valuation is normatively defensible by reference to the 
value of freedom. 
B. Freedom in U.S. Law 
Freedom is a central tenet of U.S. jurisprudence both in 
the context of constitutional interpretation and in the context 
of common law adjudication.306  The importance of freedom to 
U.S. jurisprudence has pedigree.  English common law 
developed as part of the social resistance to regal power—
vested in the hands of the King’s appointed Lord Chancellor.307  
 
 302.  Rosalind Dixon & Martha Nussbaum, Children’s Rights and the 
Capabilities Approach: The Question of Special Priority, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 549, 
557 (2012). 
 303.  Id. at 556–57. 
 304.  See supra notes 295–97. 
 305.  Hathaway, supra note 5. 
 306.  Terry L. Anderson & Lea-Rachel Kosnik, Sustainable Skepticism and 
Sustainable Development, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 439, 442 (2002). 
 307.  THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 
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In fact, one of the most well-known writs was developed by the 
common law courts literally to secure the freedom of the 
subjects of the realm against legal overreach—the writ of 
habeas corpus.308 
In the context of U.S. constitutional interpretation, 
freedom is a central part of the Bill of Rights and later 
constitutional amendments.  The First Amendment enshrines 
the freedom of speech and religion.309  The Second Amendment 
links the right of the people to keep and bear arms to the 
security of a free state.310  The Third Amendment secures the 
freedom of the population against military requisitions.311  The 
Fourth Amendment secures the freedom of the person and his 
possession from unreasonable searches and seizures.312 The 
Fifth Amendment protects the freedom from abuse of criminal 
process and the freedom of property ownership and so on.313 
Freedom—or more precisely the construction of 
sustainable government for a free society—is the core purpose 
of the body of the 1787 Constitution before the addition of the 
Bill of Rights.314  The framers purposefully designed the United 
States Constitution on the model of a “mixed” constitution,315 
or “a constitution containing monarchical, aristocratic, and 
democratic elements.”316 The purpose of such a mixed 
 
57–58 (5th ed., 2001). 
 308.  Id. 
 309.  Jack M. Balkin, Old-School/New-School Speech Regulation, 127 HARV. 
L. REV. 2296, 2301–06 (2014) (setting out the infrastructure of free expression). 
 310.  Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, In The Civic Republic: Crime, 
the Inner City, and the Democracy of Arms-Being a Disquisition on the Revival of 
the Militia at Large, 45 CONN. L. REV. 1605, 1605 (2013) (arguing that the 
“Second Amendment’s notion of a universal militia can be the basis of a new 
partnership between police and citizens in urban America” that “can, if properly 
developed, be a useful tool in fighting crime in inner-city communities.”). 
 311.  Thomas L. Avery, The Third Amendment: The Critical Protections of a 
Forgotten Amendment, 53 WASHBURN L.J. 179, 179–80 (2012) (“By prohibiting 
quartering, the Framers sought to bar the projection of military power into the 
home during peacetime in order to protect both property and privacy.”). 
 312.  Kerr, supra note 84.. 
 313. Ryan C. Williams, The Paths to Griswold, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2155, 
2169–72 (2014) (discussing the importance of liberty in jurisprudence construing 
the Fifth Amendment). 
 314.  Carl H. Esbeck, Uses and Abuses of Textualism and Originalism in 
Establishment Clause Interpretation, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 489, 502 (2011). 
 315.  See Gerhard Casper, Executive-Congressional Separation of Power 
During the Presidency of Thomas Jefferson, 47 STAN. L. REV. 473, 476 (1995). 
 316.  See Robert G. Natelson, A Republic, Not a Democracy? Initiative, 
Referendum, and the Constitution’s Guarantee Clause, 80 TEX. L. REV., 807, 831–
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constitution is to provide the governmental structures 
necessary to secure the political freedom of society from rule 
by faction, mob rule, or tyranny.317  It is in this sense then that 
the original 1787 Constitution sought to “secure the Blessings 
of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity.”318 
Freedom is central in various branches of the common 
law.319  It is axiomatic principle in the common law of 
contracts,320  torts,321 and property.322  It is a common theme 
that weaves its way through the entire web of common law 
jurisprudence.323 
As central as the concept of “freedom” is, there is no ready 
single legal definition of what the term means.324  Freedom can 
refer to multiple different values that at times appear 
incompatible.325  Typically, political theory distinguishes 
 
32 (2002).  The idea of a mixed constitution originates with Polybius’ description 
of the Roman constitution.  John Lawrence Hill, A Third Theory of Liberty: The 
Evolution of the Conception of Freedom in American Constitutional Thought, 29 
Hastings Const. L.Q. 115, 137, fn. 83 (2002).  It become popularized in modern 
times by Renaissance Italian constitutional thought.  See LAURO MARTINES, 
POWER AND IMAGINATION, CITY STATES IN RENAISSANCE ITALY 312–14 (1979) 
(discussing the influence on mixed constitutionalism on the appraisal of Venetian 
and Florentine republican experiences).  This understanding traveled to the 
United States and informed the drafting of the U.S. Constitution.  DAVID J. 
BEDERMAN, THE CLASSIC FOUNDATIONS OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: 
PREVAILING WISDOM 75 (2008) (discussing the influence of mixed 
constitutionalism on Adams). 
 317.  See Cynthia R. Farina, The Consent of the Governed: Against Simple 
Rules for a Complex World, 72 CHI.-KEN L. REV. 987, 1009 (1997) (“The mixed 
constitution, so perfect in theory for its capacity to control power through the 
creation of separate and counterbalancing bodies in government, had been 
subverted in practice by executive undermining of legislative independence.”). 
 318.  U.S. CONST., pmbl; see also Alexander Tsesis, Maxim Constitutionalism: 
Liberal Equality for the Common Good, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1609, 1640 (2013) 
(discussing Hamilton’s explanation of the preambular phrase). 
 319.  See Steven J. Eagle, Penn Central and its Reluctant Muftis, 66 BAYLOR 
L. REV. 1, 10 fn. 48 (2014). 
 320.  E. Allan Farnsworth, The Past of Promise: An Historical Introduction to 
Contract, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 576, 599–607 (1969) (discussing the role of freedom 
of contract in modern contract law). 
 321.  Guido Calabresi, Torts – The Law of the Mixed Society, 56 TEX. L. REV. 
519, 521 (1978). 
 322.  UGO MATTEI, BASIC PRINCIPLES OF PROPERTY LAW: A COMPARATIVE 
LEGAL AND ECONOMIC INTRODUCTION 38 (Praeger ed., 2000). 
 323.  See supra notes 313–16. 
 324.  See Mark Pettit Jr., Freedom, Freedom of Contract, and the ‘Rise and 
Fall’, 79 B.U. L. REV. 263, 267 (1999) (noting the contradictory meanings of 
freedom in the context of freedom of contract). 
 325.  Id. 
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between negative freedoms (freedom from someone or 
something) and positive freedom (freedom to do something).326  
These freedoms are largely viewed as incompatible with each 
other.327  The question thus remains which form of freedom is 
inherent in U.S. law and whether this form of freedom is in fact 
the same kind used in social science research in measuring and 
defining development. 
C. Freedom as Non-Domination 
This Article posits that freedom in U.S. law is at the very 
least consistent with the paradigm of non-domination, or 
republican freedom.328  Freedom as non-domination follows the 
civic humanist tradition.329  Civic humanism came into its own 
in 1400s Italian Renaissance thought.330 It spread quickly to 
the rest of Europe and England.331  Civic humanism deeply 
influenced political thinkers up to and perhaps including 
Montesquieu.332 
Contemporary theorists such as Quentin Skinner and 
Philip Pettit recently re-theorized freedom as non-
domination.333  At core, their theory defines freedom as 
 
 326.  For a full discussion, see Frederic G. Sourgens, Functions of Freedom, 48 
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 471, 518–28 (2015). 
 327.  See id. at 518. 
 328.  See, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander, Property’s Ends: The Publicness of 
Private Law Values, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1257, 1277–84 (2014) (discussing the 
importance of non-domination to the law of property); Yasmin Dawood, The 
Antidomination Model and the Judicial Oversight of Democracy, 96 GEO. L.J. 
1411, 1428–31, 1478–84 (2008)  (setting out the theory of non-domination and 
applying in the context of election law); Glen Staszewski, Statutory Interpretation 
as Contestatory Democracy, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 221, 240–45 (2013)  (applying 
non-domination theories of freedom to statutory interpretation). 
 329.  ERIC NELSON, THE GREEK TRADITION IN REPUBLICAN THOUGHT 8–9 
(2004)  (discussing the historical study of civic humanism in the modern history 
of ideas). 
 330.  See QUENTIN SKINNER, 1 THE FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN POLITICAL 
THOUGHT 70–72 (Cambridge Univ. Press ed., 1978) (discussing the roots of civic 
humanism and its full emergence in the early 1400s). 
 331.  See id. at 193-212. 
 332.  Céline Spector, Montesquieu: Critique of Republicanism?, in 
REPUBLICANISM: HISTORY, THEORY, AND PRACTICE 38, 39 (Daniel Weinstock & 
Christian Nadeau eds., 2004)  (outlining the scholarly debate whether 
Montesquieu remained a humanist or was an enlightenment liberal). 
 333.  See PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND 
GOVERNMENT (Oxford Univ. Press ed., 1997); see also QUENTIN SKINNER, 
LIBERTY BEFORE LIBERALISM (Cambridge Univ. Press ed., 1998). 
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independence of members of a society from arbitrary power.334  
Freedom requires that no one has “the capacity to interfere in 
their affairs on an arbitrary basis.”335  This conception of 
freedom as non-domination overcomes the modern dichotomy 
between negative and positive freedom. 
The republican conception of liberty is akin to the negative 
conception in maintaining that what liberty requires is the 
absence of something, not necessarily the presence.  It is akin 
to the positive conception, however, in holding that that which 
must be absent has to do with mastery rather than 
interference.  Freedom consists, not in the presence of self-
master, and not in the absence of interference by other, but 
rather in the absence of mastery by others: in the absence, as 
I prefer to put it, of domination.336 
There is a strong historical case for republican freedom.  
Civic humanism—and its republican conception of freedom—
predominated in the formative periods of English common law, 
the English revolution, and American constitutional 
thought.337  Concepts of freedom influenced the English 
revolution.338 They were similarly influential in the context of 
the American Revolution339 and the drafting of the U.S. 
Constitution.340  The use of a republican conception of freedom 
therefore is largely consistent as a historical matter with the 
original principles upon which the Constitution was based.341  
Non-domination in other words is a conception of freedom that 
is consistent with the requirements of the partial openness of 
constitutional interpretation outlined in Part I.342 
The paradigm of non-domination is further analytically 
consistent with the contemporary logic of equal protection.  
Non-domination seeks to extend legal protection to all in equal 
manner such as to deprive any one person or group of the 
 
 334.  PETTIT, supra note 333 at 55 (defining arbitrary power procedurally as 
interference “without reference to the interests, or the opinions, of those 
affected”); SKINNER, supra note 330, at 70. 
 335.  Philip Pettit, Republican Freedom and Contestatory Democratization, in 
DEMOCRACY’S VALUES 163, 165 (Ian Shapiro et al. eds., 1999). 
 336.  See id. 
 337.  See POCOCK, supra note 47, at 333–551. 
 338.  See id. at 361–71. 
 339.  See id. at 506. 
 340.  See id. at 522–23; BEDERMAN, supra note 262, at 1. 
 341.  See POCOCK, supra note 47, at 522–23. 
 342.  See discussion supra Part I.B.2. 
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capacity to dominate others by legal means.343 Equal protection 
in republican theory serves as a safeguard against arbitrary 
interventions.344 Equal protection as developed in 
jurisprudence similarly seeks to prohibit “discrimination that 
is arbitrary or otherwise unjustified,”345 thus providing a point 
of overlap with the concern of republican freedom: arbitrary 
interference.346 
Equal protection jurisprudence, like republican freedom, 
uses a procedural definition of arbitrariness.347  Thus, “for 
decades, heightened judicial scrutiny has been the holy grail of 
equal protection advocacy.”348 One way to achieve heightened 
scrutiny is proof of reliance by the challenged law upon a 
suspect or quasi-suspect classification.349  To determine 
whether the challenged law relies upon suspect or quasi-
suspect classification, the Court consults suspect classification 
criteria, famously originating in footnote four of United States 
v. Carolene Products Co.350 “To ‘qualify’ as a suspect 
classification, the group disfavored under that classification 
must: (1) be politically powerless; (2) have suffered a history of 
discrimination; (3) be defined by an immutable trait; and (4) be 
a discrete and insular minority.351 The Court has also looked 
at a fifth element: the extent to which the trait relates to one’s 
ability to participate in society, such that the trait is 
presumptively more or less relevant to legitimate legislative 
goals.”352 
Factors one through four look to procedural arbitrariness: 
they look not to the quality of the reasons provided for the 
classification.353  They look instead to the ability of the affected 
 
 343.  Pettit supra note 324, at 55  (defining arbitrary power procedurally as 
interference “without reference to the interests, or the opinions, of those 
affected”); SKINNER LIBERTY, supra note 333, at 70.  
 344.  See, e.g., Note, A Madisonian Interpretation of the Equal Protection 
Doctrine, 91 YALE L.J. 1403–29  (1982). 
 345.  Susannah W. Pollvogt, Marriage Equality, United States v. Windsor, and 
the Crisis in Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 42 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1045, 1046–47 
(2014). 
 346.  See Pettit, supra note 324, at 55. 
 347.  See Pollvogt, supra note 345, at 1046–47. 
 348.  Id. at 1049. 
 349.  Id. at 1050. 
 350.  United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
 351.  See id. 
 352.  Id. at 1052. 
 353.  See id. 
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group to provide substantive input into—and be heard as part 
of—the underlying legislative deliberations.  Substantive 
arbitrariness is only then considered at the next stage of the 
equal protection analysis, but against a higher reasons 
requirement than if the underlying action had not been 
procedurally arbitrary.354 
The paradigm of non-domination also historically and 
analytically accounts for the development of the common law.  
The historical influences on constitutional law discussed above 
similarly had a lasting impact on the development on English 
and early-American common law.355  The historical roots 
therefore would suggest that as a matter of starting point at 
least non-domination is an important conception of freedom for 
an understanding of common law development.356 
This historical hypothesis can be tested against more 
recent additions to the common law such as the law of 
unconscionability in the law of contracts.  Unconscionability 
seeks to protect parties against deeply oppressive bargains.357  
To do so, unconscionability looks to procedural and substantive 
elements.358 The procedural elements often require an 
examination of whether there was an absence of “meaningful 
choice” on the part of the weaker party.359  Substantive 
unconscionability then looks to whether the bargain was 
“unfair.”360  The ultimate gateway question, as the literature 
has shown, is whether there is a strong procedural flaw in the 
bargain that would lead to a situation of domination.361  
Although unconscionability does not give a remedy for purely 
 
 354.  See Susannah W. Pollvogt, Unconstitutional Animus, 81 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 887, 892–98 (2012).  See also Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The 
Dangerous Thirteenth Amendment, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1459, 1469 (2012) 
(discussing the importance of non-domination as a background for adoption of the 
thirteenth amendment and noting that many of the equal protection lawsuits 
would better fit under this doctrinal umbrella). 
 355.  See POCOCK, supra note 47, at 333–551. 
 356.  See id. 
 357.  Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 
47 STAN. L. REV. 211, 212 (1995) (“The principle of unconscionability, developed 
and elaborated within the last forty years, is similarly rooted in the idea that a 
party who has bargained unfairly should not be able fully to enforce the resulting 
contract.”) 
 358.  Peter B. Rutledge & Christopher R. Drahozal, Contract and Choice, 2013 
B.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 3 (2013). 
 359.  Id. 
 360.  See id. 
 361.  See Eisenberg, supra note 357, at 212. 
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procedural arbitrariness (i.e., it requires that the bargain was 
substantively unfair), the onus of the analysis is to protect the 
bargaining situation rather than to judicially impose 
objectively fair terms in bargains disfavored by the bench.362  
The point is to protect contracting parties against domination 
by private means in the same way as constitutional law seeks 
to protect citizens from domination by public means. 
The paradigm of non-domination overlaps in many 
regards with the capabilities approach but does not completely 
coincide with it.  Sen argues that “[t]he republican view of 
freedom . . . adds to the capabilities-based perspective . . . .”363  
Both the republican view and the capabilities approach share 
source material in the work of Stoic philosophy and the (Roman 
treatment of) Aristotle.364  Both also look to potential and what 
a person could achieve rather than simply at what a person has 
in fact achieved.365  Of course, both disagree on the perspective 
to take.366  The capabilities approach takes the perspective of 
the subject of freedom—it asks what a person could accomplish 
if he or she chose a certain course of action.367  The republican 
approach takes the perspective of impediments to freedom; it 
asks whether freedom is context-dependent upon the arbitrary 
actions of others.368  These approaches therefore will, at times, 
come to different results.369  Yet, these differences are not the 
result of deep-seated philosophical differences but rather 
complementary perspectives that measure the same thing 
from slightly different vantage points.  To borrow from physics, 
depending upon the manner of looking at it, light appears as a 
 
 362.  Larry A. DiMateo & Bruce L. Rich, A Consent Theory of 
Unconscionability: An Empirical Study of Law in Action, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 
1067, 1071  (2006). 
 363.  SEN, supra note 23, at 308. 
 364.  See SEN, supra note 23, at xxiii-xxiv; MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, CREATING 
CAPABILITIES, THE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT APPROACH 130 (2013) (noting the 
Stoic influences of the capabilities approach); ERIC J. OLSEN, CIVIC 
REPUBLICANISM AND THE PROPERTIES OF DEMOCRACY: A CASE STUDY OF POST-
SOCIALIST POLITICAL THEORY 140 (2006)  (noting the tension between the 
Aristotelian and the neo-Roman camp of modern republicanism); BERNARD R. 
BOXILL, DOMINATION AND SLAVERY, IN THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE HISTORY 
OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 637, 638 (noting the Stoic Ciceronian influence on 
Republicanism). 
 365.  See SEN, supra note 23, at 306–08. 
 366.  See SEN, supra note 23, at 306–08. 
 367.  See SEN, supra note 23, at 306–08. 
 368.  See SEN, supra note 23, at 306–08. 
 369.  See SEN, supra note 23, at 306–08. 
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wave or as a particle.370  It is, or currently appears to us to be, 
both.371  Freedom similarly can accommodate both of these 
perspectives because they examine the same ultimate thing: 
the social conditioning of human flourishing.372 
D. Non-Domination and Sequencing Path Dependence 
Freedom as non-domination provides a normative 
justification for the sequencing path dependence described by 
Professor Hathaway.  Sequencing path dependence posits that 
“where there are three or more choosers and three or more 
alternative outcomes, the sequence in which alternatives are 
considered can decisively influence the outcome.”373 
Sequencing path dependence “draws primarily on rational 
choice theory,”374 which submits that “when there are three or 
more choosers and three or more alternative outcomes, “ ‘ no 
method of amalgamating individual judgments can 
simultaneously satisfy some reasonable conditions of fairness 
on the method and a condition of logicality on the result,’ if 
logicality is defined as a complete and transitive ordering of 
alternatives.”375 Hathaway demonstrates how sequencing path 
dependence has been put to good use by advocates such as the 
NAACP in its litigation strategy culminating in Brown v. 
Board of Education and is habitually used by members of the 
Supreme Court in making decisions on petitions for 
certiorari.376 
The key problem sequencing path dependence identifies is 
 
 370.  RUSTY L. MYERS, THE BASICS OF PHYSICS 172 (2006). 
 371.  Id. 
 372.  Compare MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, CREATING CAPABILITIES: THE HUMAN 
DEVELOPMENT APPROACH 127–29 (2013)  (discussing the influence of Aristotle 
and the Stoics on modern thought and the importance of their views of flourishing 
on the capabilities approach) with GEOFFREY HINCHLIFFE, LIBERTY AND 
EDUCATION: A CIVIC REPUBLICAN APPROACH 15-17 (2015) (discussing the tension 
of eudemonia in contemporary republican thought); cf. CICERO, ON DUTIES 303 
(Walter Miller trans., 1913) (44 BCE) (searching for the highest good).  The 
difference ultimately is that (modern) republicanism appears to instrumentalize 
human flourishing to create a sustainable republican government whereas the 
capabilities approach sees human flourishing as an end in itself.  Id. 
 373.  Hathaway, supra note 5, at 107–08. 
 374.  Hathaway, supra note 5, at 107. 
 375.  Hathaway, supra note 5, at 117 (quoting WILLIAM H. RIKER, LIBERALISM 
AGAINST POPULISM 116 (1982)). 
 376.  Hathaway, supra note 5, at 147, 148. 
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that there is no inherent logic in legal outcomes.377  If the result 
in Brown v. Board of Education depended upon the order in 
which issues were presented for adjudication to the Court, its 
celebrated conclusion that “in the field of public education the 
doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place” is entirely 
contingent.378  A dystopian scholar might opine that with a 
different set of litigation strategies on both sides of the issue, 
“separate but equal” might still be law of the land today.379  
This is certainly a disquieting thought.  And, one might add, a 
thought which at first blush appears inconsistent with an 
intuitive idea of freedom. 
Despite this disquieting thought, freedom as non-
domination requires something like sequencing path 
dependence of the law.  If law is not sequencing path 
dependent, many fundamental questions of social organization 
would be determined as a matter of law without directly taking 
into account the interests and opinions of those affected by the 
social organization law imposes.380  In the context of Brown, 
the law would always have to be that “ ‘ separate but equal’ has 
no place” in public education no matter what the parties 
submitted.381  But this in turn would mean that law itself 
 
 377.  See Hathaway, supra note 5, at 147 (noting that sequencing path 
dependence further refines the conclusion that law is nonergodic); see also Johan 
Deprez, Risk, Uncertainty, and Nonergodicity in the Determination of Investment-
Backed Expectations: A Post Keynesian Alternative to Posnerian Doctrine in the 
Analysis of Regulatory Takings, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1221, 1223–24 (2001) (“An 
ergodic context is one where there is no structural change, so that the statistical 
observations of one period coincide with those of another period and those of all 
periods combined.  A nonergodic context is one where there is structural change 
so that the statistical observations of one period do not coincide with those of 
other periods and those of all periods combined”). 
 378.  Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495  (1954). 
 379.  See Kira Zalan, The New Separate and Unequal, U.S. NEWS (May 16, 
2014), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2014/05/16/brown-v-board-of-
educations-60th-anniversary-stirs-history-reality (“Despite the historic ruling, 
decades would pass before integration took root in Southern states, which 
rebelled furiously against federal policies regarding race.  Yet today, while not 
legally sanctioned, more U.S. students are in segregated schools than a few 
decades ago.  And experts say that these schools now are still as inherently 
unequal as their legally sanctioned predecessors.”). 
 380.  See Robert Justin Lipkin, Pragmatism – The Unfinished Revolution: 
Doctrinaire and Reflective Pragmatism in Rorty’s Social Thought, 67 TUL. L. REV. 
1561, 1625–28 (1993) (discussing the pragmatic response to Dworkin’s one-right-
answer thesis). 
 381.  Brown, 347 U.S. at 495. 
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would become procedurally arbitrary.382  Law would organize 
society without being sensitive to the actual inputs of those 
whom law governs.383  Society would be dominated not by a 
king—but by the law itself.  This result would mean that law 
could not in fact develop according to a freedom dimension, at 
all. 
Flipping perspectives from the constraints of social 
conditions imposed upon the agent to that of the capabilities of 
the agent him or herself, sequence path dependence still is 
broadly consistent with a view of freedom premised in the 
capabilities approach.384  On the most basic level, a model that 
is not sequence path dependent, i.e., responsive to the 
communication strategies of members of society over time, 
deprives persons of the capabilities to engage in the process of 
self-governance through legal process.385  A person is the object 
of legal determinations but never the agent of legal 
betterment.386  From the perspective of human flourishing 
underlying the capabilities approach, such a result is ethically 
impoverishing.387 
On a more technical level, the rational choice theorems 
upon which Professor Hathaway relies are themselves 
incomplete.388  The impossibility theorem of rational choice 
upon which sequence path dependence depends lacks 
sensitivity to the full informational basis upon which decisions 
are reached.389  Most centrally, it is not sensitive to information 
about both positive and negative freedoms.390 
In this light, sequence path dependence proves to be a 
discourse tool.391  It permits a reasoned engagement that takes 
into account, piece by piece, the relevant information to reach 
better decisions over time—or develop—without necessarily 
 
 382.  See supra note 328. 
 383.  See Ara Lovitt, Constitutional Confusion, 50 STAN. L. REV. 565, 573, 576 
(1998) (outlining Dworkin’s case that a moral reading of the law is not 
undemocratic but conceding that it is not highly persuasive to those advancing 
the criticism). 
 384.  See AMARTYA SEN, RATIONALITY AND FREEDOM 584 (2004). 
 385.  See SEN, supra note 23, at 291. 
 386.  See SEN, supra note 23, at 291. 
 387.  See SEN, supra note 23, at 291. 
 388.  Hathaway, supra note 5, at 107. 
 389.  See SEN, supra note 23, at 93–94. 
 390.  See SEN, supra note 23, at 282. 
 391.  See SEN, supra note 23, at 122. 
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requiring there to be a right answer that is theoretically 
attainable.392  Sequence path dependence thus provides a 
means of comparison of different potential outcomes with an 
increasing amount of information provided to the judiciary by 
those most immediately affected by the rules and standards in 
question.393  It is a means by which lawyers and citizens alike 
can participate in legal governance processes, i.e., 
communicate with the law, rather than an impediment to 
freedom. 
IV. CRITICALITY 
Criticality or judgment is the fourth dimension of 
development.  This dimension describes how law relates to 
time.394  At core, the fourth dimension of development posits 
that law develops by means of a process of critical judgment 
and self-assessment.395 
Critical judgment is an integral component of the 
capabilities approach, as well as republican theory.396  In the 
social sciences and political theory, critical judgment is needed 
to explain why drastic change is possible, at all.397  Social 
scientific research submits that the social world is constructed 
out of our own contingent cultural and linguistic traditions.398  
This social construction tends to negate the possibility of 
“neutral” or transcendental god’s eye view.399  Critical 
judgment explains how it is possible to take account of an 
outsider’s perspective from within a socially constructed 
linguistic and cultural universe and even break with the 
traditions inherent in that universe. 
Critical judgment is central to understanding how law 
progresses.  Both in the common law and in constitutional 
interpretation, the courts at various points in history have 
rejected tradition, i.e., precedent, and adopted a significantly 
 
 392.  See SEN, supra note 23, at 103–05. 
 393.  See SEN, supra note 23, at 103–05. 
 394.  See Michael S. Moore, The Dead Hand of Constitutional Tradition, 19 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 263, 272 (1996)  (noting the relationship of critical 
judgment to tradition). 
 395.  SEN, supra note 23, at 169–70. 
 396.  SEN, supra note 23, at 169–70.; POCOCK, supra note 47, at 54. 
 397.  Hathaway, supra note 5, at 386. 
 398.  SEN, supra note 23, at 119–121. 
 399.  SEN, supra note 23, at 119–121. 
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different point of view going forward.400  How is it nevertheless 
possible to reconcile this departure with legal discourse?401  In 
other words, the problem of the possibility of critical judgment 
already apparent in the context of the social sciences is 
replicated in the legal context. 
Critical judgment is an important corrective to path 
dependence.  It answers why at points of great maturity in 
legal principles—the point at which increasing-returns path 
dependence and sequence path dependence have created 
significant reliance interests—radical evolution nevertheless 
occurs.402  Critical judgment distinguishes a system in which 
there is beneficial path dependence that ultimately increases 
openness, prosperity, and freedom from a traditionalist system 
that over time becomes closed, impoverished and unfree. 
A. Criticality in the Social Sciences 
Social science literature posits that social self-awareness 
presents one of the key problems for development.  Cultural 
and linguistic context can frequently obscure disparate 
treatment of different groups in society.403  Cultural and 
linguistic structures further provide internally cogent 
justifications for even severe forms of discrimination of which 
members of a society are aware.404  For instance, the difference 
in treatment of women in societies even escapes women 
themselves.405  To the extent they are aware, they may even 
themselves defend their inferior opportunities by reference to 
deeply held social beliefs about the place of women in society.406 
At the very latest, after the end of colonialism, it would be 
deeply problematic to suggest that the societies in question are 
inferior, less rational, or otherwise in need of Western aid in 
even conceiving of their own problems.407  This would suggest 
 
 400.  Mark S. Kende, Constitutional Pragmatism, The Supreme Court, and 
Democratic Revolution, 89 DENV. U. L. REV. 635, 646–47 (2012) (discussing 
revolutionary moments in U.S. constitutional jurisprudence). 
 401.  See id. 
 402.  Hathaway, supra note 5, at 664. 
 403.  SEN, supra note 23, at 166 (discussing the treatment of women in India.). 
 404.  SEN, supra note 23, at 167. 
 405.  SEN, supra note 23, at 167. 
 406.  SEN, supra note 23, at 167. 
 407.  See Sourgens, supra note 326, at 47 (“Transnational legal process thus 
can hold without self contradiction that people are free rather than states or 
peoples.”). 
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that Western culture had attained some form of unique, true 
and “transcendental” vantage point to which other societies 
still aspired.408  Structuralist anthropology and post-
structuralist theory have undermined any such claims to 
uniqueness from within the Western tradition.409  In fact, they 
have gone a good way towards disproving the availability of a 
god’s eye point of view.410 
Development literature thus needs a means by which to 
engage and affect traditionally held value-structures.  
Development is possible only to the extent that critical 
judgment is possible.  Critical judgment has comparative 
rather than absolute or “transcendental” focus.411 It recognizes 
that there is an inescapable plurality of competing 
principles.412  In so doing, critical judgment de-mystifies the 
internal truth claims of any cultural or linguistic tradition.413  
This in turn requires a constant re-examination of the general 
principles underlying cultural self-perception against the 
totality of cultural norms and the totality of circumstances 
affecting society.414   
This re-examination takes into account the relative 
position of cultural self-perception through comparison with 
and engagement of external cultural points of view.415  It allows 
for partial (and temporary) resolution of problems.416  This 
process engages value structures on their own terms and 
encourages reflective adjustment of culturally held values from 
within rather than by reference to an external reference 
point.417 
Critical judgment is a core component of the capabilities 
 
 408.  Sourgens, supra note 326, at 47. 
 409.  Jack M. Balkin, Deconstruction’s Legal Career, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 719, 
719–20 (2005). 
 410.  Id. (“Deconstructionists attacked the structuralist assumption that one 
could identify universal and/or fixed structures of meaning that shaped all 
human thought.  Deconstructionists argued that structures of social meaning are 
always unstable, indeterminate, impermanent and historically situated, 
constantly changing over time . . .). 
 411.  SEN, supra note 23, at 106. 
 412.  Id. 
 413.  See Balkin, supra note 409, at 719–20. 
 414.  SEN, supra note 23, at 107. 
 415.  SEN, supra note 23, at 108–09. 
 416.  SEN, supra note 23, at 107. 
 417.  SEN, supra note 23, at 107. 
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approach.418  In fact, the early work of Nussbaum provides one 
of the strongest English language arguments against 
transcendental truths and for a comparative approach.419  In 
this sense, the development literature following the 
capabilities approach is breaking with deeply held rationalist, 
enlightenment and liberal preconceptions which precisely 
posited the existence of a transcendental or absolute vantage 
point.420 
This development literature links up again with the pre-
enlightenment view of history and critical judgment developed 
in the humanist tradition.421  This tradition was premised in a 
similar form of critical judgment.422  In fact, such critical 
judgment was instrumental to the birth of Renaissance 
thought itself.423 The humanist mind distinguished itself from 
the medieval and classical through its understanding of the 
historical situatedness of the observer and the need to 
translate insights from other social and historical contexts 
against the backdrop of their respective social and cultural 
conditions.424  It was a rejection of tradition in favor of critique. 
B. Tradition and Critique in U.S. Jurisprudence 
The fight between tradition and critique is a central 
feature of U.S. jurisprudence.  It runs through both 
constitutional interpretation and common law adjudication.  In 
both contexts, U.S. jurisprudence is marked by a definite anti-
traditionalism fitting of humanist roots of the U.S. 
constitution. 
In the context of constitutional interpretation, the rise of 
originalism is a principal means of critique of (liberal) 
tradition.425  Originalism turns against a traditionalist gloss of 
 
 418.  SEN, supra note 23, at 107. 
 419.  NUSSBAUM, supra note 78, at 79. 
 420.  Eduardo Mendieta, From Imperial to Dialogical Cosmopolitanism, in 
HUMAN RIGHTS, HUMAN DIGNITY, AND COSMOPOLITAN IDEALS: ESSAYS ON 
CRITICAL THEORY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 119, 130 (Matthias Lutz-Bachmann & 
Amos Nascimento eds., 2014). 
 421.  JEAN GRONDIN, SOURCES OF HERMENEUTICS 137 (1995). 
 422.  Id. 
 423.  POCOCK, supra note 47, at 54–55. 
 424.  POCOCK, supra note 47, at 54–55. 
 425.  Jamal Greene, On the Origins of Originalism, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1, 13 (2009) 
(discussing the interpretation techniques employed by courts with regards to the 
Second Amendment). 
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the Constitution achieved by means of adherence to traditional 
Supreme Court jurisprudence.426  Originalism proposes that 
the meaning of the Constitution is not found in the wisdom of 
precedent but instead in careful historical analysis.427  It thus 
poses that the Court can be—and frequently is—simply wrong 
in its application of constitutional norms.428  Constitutional 
interpretation is not a function of the constitutional role of the 
United States Supreme Court.429  Constitutional 
interpretation is a matter of historical textual interpretation 
that even the organ charged with its execution can get 
wrong.430 
In the context of common law adjudication, the rise of 
pragmatism rejects that tradition can bring forth formal legal 
axioms that have validity beyond their specific social and 
commercial context.431  Central to Justice Holmes’ 
jurisprudence was that law could precisely not be boiled down 
to certain metaphysical axioms.432  Rather, law evolved as a 
response to specific needs in particular circumstances and 
needs to adapt to reflect the needs for law in new 
circumstances.433  As Karl Llewellyn would come to explain, 
such adaptation would still look to history and historical 
precedent—but would do so to translate past policy 
 
 426.  David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 877, 925 (1966). 
 427.  Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 
856–57 (1989). 
 428.  William Michael Treanor, Supreme Neglect of Text and History, 107 
MICH. L. REV. 1059, 1068 (2009)  (“The Supreme Court has recognized the 
regulatory-takings doctrine for over one hundred years, but a committed 
textualist, like a committed originalist, sees this line of precedent as an error.”). 
 429.  But see John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Interpretive 
Principles as Core of Originalism, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 371, 375 (2007) (“While 
Balkin assumes that originalism and precedent conflict, that will not be true to 
the extent that the Constitution incorporates or allows for precedent, which it 
appears to do in two ways. First, the concept of ‘judicial power’ in Article III may 
be best understood as requiring the judiciary to decide cases in accordance with 
some notion of precedent.  Second, the Constitution may treat precedent as a 
matter of federal common law that is modifiable by federal statute—thereby 
allowing for precedent without compelling it.”) 
 430.  Treanor, supra note 428, at 1067–68. 
 431.  Robert S. Summers, Pragmatic Instrumentalism in Twentieth Century 
American Thought – A Synthesis and Critique of our Dominant General Theory 
About Law and its Use, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 861, 863 (1981). 
 432.  HOLMES, supra note 2, at 1. 
 433.  Summers, supra note 431, at 863. 
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prescriptions to current policy needs.434  Again, the courts 
entrusted with common law adjudication can be wrong: not 
wrong in the sense of failing to deduce or apply the correct legal 
axiom, but wrong in the sense of failing to understand their 
role in adapting and adopting policy prescriptions fitting the 
current social problems before them.435 
Interestingly, the critique of tradition thus is central to 
both of the most important innovations of U.S. jurisprudence: 
originalism and pragmatism.436  Both originalism and 
pragmatism reject that law evolves simply as a result of 
institutional design, i.e., the courts are asked to interpret the 
constitution and adjudicate common law rights, meaning that 
the courts are by definition the criterion of legal correctness in 
both realms.437  Instead, both originalism and pragmatism 
posit that courts can be wrong because they fail to execute their 
task with requisite critical judgment.438  This makes room for 
a meaningful role of judicial dissents in both constitutional 
interpretation and common law adjudication.439  It also makes 
room for legal critique through scholarly engagement in law 
review articles and the activities of learned societies such as 
the American Law Institute. 
That both originalism and pragmatism would share a 
common methodological commitment is both surprising and 
momentous.440  It is surprising because the originalism and 
pragmatism marshal law to support radically opposed policies: 
conservativism and liberal progressivism.441  It is momentous 
 
 434.  KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 
36 (1960). 
 435.  Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917). 
 436.  See, e.g., Greene, supra note 425, at 62 (noting that originalism is a 
uniquely American jurisprudential school); Summers, supra note 431, at 863 
(noting that pragmatic instrumentalism is a uniquely American contribution to 
jurisprudence). 
 437.  See  supra note 430; supra note 434. 
 438.  See  supra note 430; supra note 434. 
 439.  Unsurprisingly, both Justice Cardozo and Justice Scalia are near 
unsurpassed masters in the art of dissenting.  See Richard A. Primus, Canon, 
Anti-Canon, and Judicial Dissent, 48 DUKE L.J. 243, 264–70 (1998) (juxtaposing 
Justice Scalia’s and Justice Cardozo’s theories of dissent). 
 440.  John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, A Pragmatic Defense of 
Originalism, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 383, 383 (2007) (noting that “originalism and 
pragmatism are uneasy companions” that can be made “friends”).  From a 
different direction, Jack Balkin arguably attempted a similar project in Living 
Originalism. JACK BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 3 (2011). 
 441.  Keith E. Whittington, Is Originalism Too Conservative?, 34 HARV. J.L. & 
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because it represents a key point of agreement in rejecting 
simple traditionalism as legal yardstick.  Interestingly, 
originalism follows a republican, humanist approach to critical 
judgment “as a result of a classicizing attempt to locate all 
value in a particular period.”442 Pragmatism follows more in 
the footsteps of the capabilities approach through constant re-
examination of precedent in light of existing policy needs.443 As 
discussed above, both perspectives reflect different sides of the 
same coin thus confirming that U.S. jurisprudence 
understands itself as “critical” in a meaningfully consistent 
manner no matter from what ideological vantage point it is 
approached. 
C. Criticality and Path Dependence 
Criticality assists in answering a puzzling question about 
path dependence.  Why would there be punctuations in the law 
leading to fundamental change, at all?444  Path dependence 
should exponentially increase stability—and thus foreclose 
punctuations in evolution or periods of rapid change.445  
Professor Hathaway notes: 
The rapid change, or “punctuations,” can be brought about 
by a number of sources: higher court opinions that overrule 
or significantly alter existing legal rules; reconsideration of 
legal rules by the courts in which they were first 
established; new legislation; introduction of novel legal 
issues; or, on rare occasions, constitutional amendments.446 
This observation, while correct, does not answer the 
fundamental and puzzling question of why courts would 
overrule themselves or reconsider legal rules despite the pull 
of path dependence in the other direction.  As discussed in the 
context of openness, Hathaway’s observation is correct that 
legal revolutions do happen.447 Legal standards do shift 
 
PUB. POL’Y 29, 29 (2011) (observing the historical and conceptual link between 
originalism and conservativism); Summers, supra note 431, at 877 (explaining 
the overlap between the pragmatic and progressive movements). 
 442. POCOCK, supra note 47, at 54–55. 
 443. Compare LLEWELLYN, supra note 434, at 36  (discussing the pragmatic 
approach to precedent) with SEN, supra note 20, at 107–09  (discussing the 
capabilities approach of comparative judgment). 
 444. Hathaway, supra note 5, at 641. 
 445. Hathaway, supra note 5, at 641. 
 446. Hathaway, supra note 5, at 641. 
 447. See discussion supra Part I.C. 
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because of the accretion of a critical mass of legal opinion 
against the existing standard.448  But how can such a critical 
mass form?  Professor Hathaway’s theory should in fact lead to 
the view of common law evolution she rejects—that the 
common law evolves continuously, imperceptibly, and 
gradually rather than that it evolves through periods of 
stability punctuated by short bursts of upheaval.449 
Introducing criticality as a dimension of development 
permits resolution of this puzzle.  Legal development is not 
blindly path dependent.  It is deeply critical in the sense that 
legal development acknowledges its own warts: rather than 
determine that a solution to a legal problem found the true 
answer, legal development looks for the best answer.450  Legal 
development is possible because common law judges know to 
take claims of truth and ultimate correctness with a grain of 
salt.451  Criticality permits and requires radical change 
precisely because the mindset of the judiciary is to compare 
legal rules to the tenability of legal outcomes.452 
This reflective attitude also explains the apparently 
punctuated nature of legal change.453  The attitude of the 
judiciary is constantly critical.454  This means that it seeks to 
test and confirm rules.455  For critique to result in radical 
change, there must be a sufficient amount of information that 
the flaws in the current legal standards are so deep that 
adjustment of that standard cannot remove the ultimate 
flaw.456  As in the sciences, such paradigm shifts appear sudden 
(we remember Galileo, Newton, and Einstein) but they are the 
 
 448. See discussion supra Part I.C. 
 449.  Hathaway, supra note 5, at 137, 141. 
 450.  See discussion supra Part IV.B. 
 451.  See discussion supra Part IV.B. 
 452.  See discussion supra Part IV.B. 
 453.  Hathaway, supra note 5, at 141. 
 454. See discussion supra Part IV.B. 
 455.  George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 
537, 520 fn. 12 (1972) (drawing a comparison between law and Kuhn’s structure 
of scientific revolutions). 
 456.  Thomas S. Ulen, A Nobel Prize in Legal Science: Theory, Empirical Work, 
and the Scientific Method in the Study of Law, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 875, 884 (2002) 
(citing Thomas S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 52–53 (3d 
ed. 1996)(“ . . . Kuhn suggested that there are scientific revolutions that occur 
because sometimes the anomalies pile up to such an extent that it is almost 
impossible to adjust the prevailing paradigm in a reasonable manner that takes 
account of the anomalies.”) 
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result of a long build up of information that enabled Galileo, 
Newton, and Einstein to posit their theories—and find 
acceptance for them.457 
Criticality is the missing piece that interlocks openness, 
prosperity, and freedom.  Criticality is the flipside of openness.  
Openness safeguards the notion that new factual and 
normative material can in fact be considered.458  Criticality 
explains how this material is considered.  Whereas openness is 
outward looking—it accepts new material—criticality is 
inward looking.459  Criticality does not concern what if any 
outside material should be considered (in fact, criticality can 
and has operated without significant change in external 
material simply as a matter of reevaluating existing 
patrimony) but how the judiciary should relate to itself and the 
law as part of its decision-making process.460 
Criticality greatly aids prosperity.  Absent criticality, 
evolutionary development is largely inefficient.461  Evolution 
does not have a goal—it occurs as a matter of course.462  To be 
goal-oriented, evolution must be guided by purposive 
reasoning.  Criticality permits reflective, purposive reasoning 
about the efficiency of law.463  It permits a readjustment of 
legal standards so as better to serve the economic needs of 
society.464  It is the combination of criticality with evolution—
rather than simply evolution—that brings about some of the 
efficiencies in the change of the common law discussed in law 
and economics scholarship.465 
Criticality finally is important to freedom.  On the 
technical side, it permits agents strategically to engage 
sequencing path dependence and bring about the Brown v. 
Board of Educations of the world.466  More substantively, 
criticality reduces the risk of domination through law because 
law is consistently reflective and comparing processes to 
 
 457. See Ulen, supra note 456, at 884. 
 458.  See discussion supra Part I. 
 459.  See discussion supra Part IV.A. 
 460.  See discussion supra Part IV.B. 
 461.  Hathaway, supra note 5, at 631–32. 
 462.  Hathaway, supra note 5, at 639. 
 463.  See discussion supra Part IV.A. 
 464.  See discussion supra Part IV.B. 
 465.  Hathaway, supra note 5, at 631. 
 466.  See discussion supra Part III.D. 
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outcomes.467  Criticality permits law to be constantly engaged 
in an assessment of the law that can make the interests and 
opinions of those governed by law relevant to the law itself.468  
This constant assessment facilitates and increases the 
capabilities of members of society to participate in the 
processes of self-governance.469 
V. PREFERENCE OR PARITY? THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
THE FOUR DIMENSIONS OF DEVELOPMENT 
So far, this Article has laid out the four dimensions of 
development.  It has not yet addressed whether any of these 
four dimensions is preferred to the others.  It has also not yet 
addressed whether development permits trade-offs between 
the different dimensions of development. 
This Section rejects the notion that legal development 
necessarily prefers any one of the dimensions of development 
to the others.470  The typical preference expressed in both 
political and legal theory is that freedom holds a privileged 
position vis-à-vis other values.  As discussed below, such a 
preference is not a legal necessity.471  One cannot critique a 
decision as wrongly decided as matter of law because it did not 
maximize the value of the freedom dimension.472  Such a 
critique remains and must remain a political proposition.473 
This Section also rejects the notion that legal development 
refers to an aggregate increase in the sum total of the 
individual and quantified openness, prosperity, freedom, and 
critical judgment values.474  As discussed below, such a 
position, though tempting, fails because openness, prosperity, 
freedom, and critical judgment, while related, are not 
measured according to a single scale.475  Trade-offs are thus 
theoretically foreclosed.476 
This Section then briefly addresses the problem of legal 
 
 467.  See discussion supra Part III.D. 
 468.  See discussion supra Part III.D. 
 469.  See discussion supra Part III.D. 
 470.  See discussion infra Part V.A. 
 471.  See discussion infra Part V.A. 
 472.  See discussion infra Part V.A. 
 473.  See discussion infra Part V.D. 
 474.  See discussion infra Part V.B. 
 475.  See discussion infra Part V.B. 
 476.  See discussion infra Part V.B. 
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development in the face of social and economic recession.477  
There are circumstances in which it will not be possible for 
reasons outside of social control to increase each of the values 
represented by the four dimensions of development—as would 
be the case following a large natural catastrophe.478  In that 
setting, it would not be possible to increase the prosperity 
measure of society through legal evolution simply because the 
society governed by law was otherwise impoverished.479  Legal 
development in this context means that the law chooses the 
path of least reduction on any one dimension of development.480 
The Section concludes with a normative explanation for 
the parity preference of legal development and explains how 
this parity preference leaves meaningful room for political 
choice within legal development.481  The explanation thus 
seeks to place the concept of development within the context of 
our every day experience, i.e., that court decisions frequently 
are political, while providing an explanation how such political 
choice nevertheless is consistent with truly legal 
development.482 
A. Avoiding the Liberty Preference 
Liberal political and legal theorists frequently posit that 
social choice must follow a liberty preference.  John Rawls in A 
Theory of Justice submits that this preference is lexicographic 
in nature, meaning that any amount of increase in liberty 
would always be preferred to any increase, no matter how 
large, in any other value.483  Other theorists incorporate a 
weaker form of weighted preference for liberty interests.484 
It is tempting to posit that legal development similarly 
follows a form of liberty preference.485  Such a preference would 
 
 477.  See discussion infra Part V.C. 
 478.  See discussion infra Part V.C. 
 479.  See discussion infra Part V.C. 
 480.  See discussion infra Part V.C. 
 481.  See discussion infra Part V.D. 
 482.  See discussion infra Part V.D. 
 483.  RAWLS, supra note 150, at 214. 
 484.  SEN, supra note 20, at 299. 
 485.  Nathan Oman, Unity and Pluralism in Contract Law, 103 MICH. L. REV. 
1483, 1499-1505 (2005)  (discussing the priority of liberty in contract law); Kent 
Greenawalt, The Enduring Significance of Neutral Principles, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 
982, 1019 (1978)  (noting the temptation that “priority of liberty and equality of 
opportunity are implicit in our Constitution . . .”). 
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have two consequences.  First, any evolution of law that does 
not at first address freedom is not “development”—and as such 
is an erroneous departure from existing jurisprudence.486  
Second, in a choice between various evolutions of law each of 
which increase freedom, legal development requires the choice 
of the evolution that most advances or maximizes freedom no 
matter the relative increase in the other dimensions.487  For 
example, in choosing between options A (increasing freedom by 
1, prosperity by 10, openness by 10, and critical judgment by 
10, for a total increase of 31), B (increasing freedom by 2, 
prosperity by 100, openness by 1, and critical judgment by 5, 
for a total increase of 108), and C (increasing freedom by 3, 
prosperity by 2, openness by 2, and critical judgment by 2, for 
a total increase of nine), a liberty preference would choose 
option C despite the fact that option A has a higher average 
increase (10) and option B has a higher total increase in value 
(108). 
The hypothesis of a priority of freedom in legal 
development is not borne out by jurisprudence.488  
Jurisprudence frequently seeks to increase other values such 
as prosperity over freedom.489  It is thus not true descriptively 
that development requires a hard preference for freedom 
interests. 
A strict liberty preference therefore is a political 
proposition, not a legal requirement.  It makes the normative 
point that law ought to develop in a certain way rather the 
descriptive point that law does develop in that way.490  It is a 
 
 486.  RAWLS, supra note 150, at 214. 
 487.  RAWLS, supra note 150, at 214. 
 488.  One such example is the current United States Supreme Court 
jurisprudence invalidating state attempts to curtail certain forms of arbitration 
of consumer disputes.  See Buckeye Check Cashing Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 
440, 449 (2006) (requiring arbitration of disputes arising out of consumer 
contracts deemed usurious under Florida law); AT&T Mobility LLC v. 
Conception, 131 S.Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011) (Federal Arbitration Act preempts 
California state law deeming class arbitration waivers in consumer contracts 
unconscionable); see also Thomas J. Stipanowich, The Third Arbitration Trilogy: 
Stolt-Nielsen, Rent-A-Center, Conception and the Future of American Arbitration, 
22 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 323, 325–26 (2011) (discussing the effect of the recent line 
of cases). 
 489.  Sarah Rudolph Cole, On Babies and Bathwater: The Arbitration Fairness 
Act and the Supreme Court’s Recent Arbitration Jurisprudence, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 
457, 471–81 (2011) (discussing the business concern regarding class actions as 
driving factor to adopt consumer arbitration clauses). 
 490.  See Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 
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permissible and possible way that law could develop—just not 
the way that it must develop. 
B. Parity and the Quest for Pareto Superiority 
It would also be possible to posit that legal development 
refers to the net increase in the aggregate value of all four 
dimensions.491  In our example above of a choice between 
options A, B, and C, such a view of development would require 
choosing option B because it has the highest total value 
increase.492 
A view that law “develops” if the aggregate value of all four 
dimensions is increased simply errs because the four 
dimensions of legal development are incommensurate.493  For 
the parity position to have much purchase, it must be 
established that the various values of increase in openness, 
prosperity, freedom, and critical judgment can in fact be 
measured according to a single scale.494  If they cannot be 
measured according to a single scale, it is simply not 
meaningful to add up the various scores.495 
The discussion above makes clear that the four dimensions 
of development measure very different values.  Openness 
measures the receptivity of judicial decisions to new factual 
and normative concerns; it can do so for instance by 
quantifying the diversity of input in the legal decision-making 
process.496  Prosperity measures property protection; it can do 
so by quantifying income and income distribution within 
society.497  Freedom measures civic participation in legal 
decision-making processes; it can do so by relying on various 
new development measures designed by social scientists in 
response to the capabilities approach.498  Criticality measures 
 
HARV. L. REV. 405, 435 (1989) (drawing a similar distinction in the context of 
statutory construction). 
 491.  See SEN, supra note 234, at 12–16 (discussing reduction of choice to a 
utility function in economics literature). 
 492.  See discussion supra Part V.A. 
 493.  See Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 
MICH. L. REV. 779, 796 (1994) (incommensurability “occurs when the relevant 
goods cannot be aligned along a single metric without doing violence to our 
considered judgments about how these goods are best characterized”). 
 494.  See id. 
 495.  See id. 
 496.  See discussion supra Part I. 
 497.  See discussion supra Part II. 
 498.  See discussion supra Part III. 
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the reflection exercised in decision-making; it can do so by 
quantifying the rate of adaptation of legal rules to the current 
socio-economic environment.499 
Development therefore must refer to something other than 
an aggregate increase of the four dimensions in question; it 
refers to an increase in each of the four dimensions.  It requires 
that an option reducing one of the dimensions is not 
permissible no matter how much it increases one of the other 
dimensions.500  A radical increase in freedom is not acceptable 
at the cost of a small reduction in prosperity etc.501  In other 
words, legal development treats the current balance between 
the four dimensions as a floor.502  Legal developments cannot 
have the consequence of dropping any one dimension below the 
floor achieved.  Such an evolution would—over the long term—
be deemed in legal error.503 The assessment that law 
developed, as distinguished from the descriptive statement 
that law changed, thus refers to an increase of some or all of 
the four dimensions without reduction in any of the others.  It 
refers to a completely (rather than a net) beneficial change in 
legal prescriptions. 
Expressed in economic terms, legal development supposes 
that the four dimensions of legal development create 
efficiencies.504  An increase in one dimension not purchased at 
the price of an immediate reduction in another is deemed to 
increase all dimensions over time.505  Thus, an increase in 
openness over the long term will increase prosperity, freedom, 
and critical judgment, and vice versa.  This supposition means 
that there typically are options available that increase all 
dimensions of development because of these efficiencies.  
Economics suggests that there is an outside limit to these 
efficiencies—called optimality or Pareto optimality.506  When 
this limit is reached, and only when this limit is reached, one 
value can only increase at a net cost to the others.  But before 
 
 499.  See discussion supra Part IV. 
 500.  It thus grants similar priority to all four dimensions and accords each of 
them the liberty priority in Rawlsian justice.  See RAWLS, supra note 150, at 291. 
 501.  See Sunstein, supra note 493, at 805. 
 502.  See Sunstein, supra note 493, at 796. 
 503.  See Sunstein, supra note 493, at 796. 
 504.  See Paul Rogers, The Limited Case for an Efficiency Defense in Horizontal 
Mergers, 58 TUL. L. REV. 503, 504 n.9 (1983) (discussing Pareto optimality). 
 505.  See id. 
 506.  See id. 
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that point, it is possible to leverage the interests of each 
dimension to achieve common gains. 
C. Development and Social Loss 
So far, the assumption was that social conditions do not 
change drastically for the worse.  On the basis of this 
assumption, it is physically possible for the law to improve the 
law measured on all four dimensions of legal development.  
This assumption is obviously not realistic.  Natural 
catastrophes, economic crises, and war can and frequently do 
have a material impact on what the law can achieve.507  And 
most times, the consequence of such events is net social loss no 
matter how well the legal system is set up. 
The question thus arises how law “develops” on our four 
dimensions in the face of such social loss.  As discussed above, 
the general rule is that development refers to an increase along 
all four dimensions.508  Thus, when social loss occurs, it would 
not be possible for law to “develop” by increasing all four 
dimensions of openness, prosperity, freedom, and criticality.  
Rather, it stagnates along with social order in general. 
This answer is hardly satisfactory.  Part of the point of law 
is to set up a form of guarantee of order precisely in times social 
and economic loss.509  A statement that law can only develop in 
good times thus would tend to get something intuitively wrong 
about the point of law.510 This still leaves the question—how do 
we measure development in such a loss-making environment? 
Sen again provides a very helpful clue as to the answer to 
this question.  As discussed in the context of criticality, he 
notes that development takes a comparative view and not a 
transcendental, absolute view.511  Thus, while an absolute view 
 
 507.  See Mark Duffield, Globalization and War Economies: Promoting Order 
or the Return of History?, 23 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 21, 32 (1999) (discussing 
the high social costs of war); Tax Relief & Hurricane Katrina, 25 ANN. REV. 
BANKING & FIN. L. 166, 167 (2006)  (noting the “enormous cost of Katrina”). 
 508.  See discussion supra Part V.B. 
 509.  See David P. Fidler, War, Law & Liberal Thought: The Use of Force in 
the Reagan Years, 11 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 45, 55 (1994) (noting the classical 
position that “law is the best safeguard against war, destruction, and chaos”). 
 510.  See Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The Imbecilic Executive, 99 VA. L. 
REV. 1361, 1380 (2013) (“The Act’s preamble carried an important constitutional 
lesson, for it reaffirmed what was implicit in the Bill of Rights.  The executive 
could not, as a legal matter, create, modify, or suspend laws, in a domestic crisis, 
even when doing so was for the public good in time of crisis”). 
 511.  See SEN, supra note 20, at 106–13. 
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of development would consider that movement in the “wrong” 
direction would not be development at all, a comparative view 
would not need to take such a stark view.  Rather, a 
comparative perspective would posit that even between facially 
bad choices, it is possible to identify a choice that is better (or 
at the very least, a choice that is worse).512 
Applying the lesson from this Article so far, the method to 
compare and choose between choices is to look at the overall 
impact on the four dimensions of development brought about a 
downturn.  There are two reasonable alternative methods to do 
so: one backward looking and one forward looking.  First, it is 
possible to take stock of the net reduction a crisis has caused 
for each of the four dimensions of development.  It is possible 
that a crisis would have a far greater impact on one of the four 
dimensions than the other three.513  In that circumstance, the 
first method would be to seek to re-establish the pre-crisis 
balance by preferring the hardest hit dimension of legal 
development.514 
Second, it is possible to look forward rather than 
backwards.  In that instance, one would seek to choose the 
option that does the least harm going forward.  The choice then 
is to pick the option that reduces any one dimension of 
development the least amount possible.515  This would 
 
 512.  See SEN, supra note 20, at 399–401. 
 513.  For instance, the 9/11 attacks appear to have disproportionately 
diminished freedom.  See Lee Epstein et al. The Supreme Court During Crisis: 
How War Affects only Non-War Cases, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 1 (2005) (“our analyses 
demonstrate that when crises threaten the nation’s security, the justices are 
substantially more likely to curtail rights and liberties than when peace 
prevails.”).  The 2008 financial crisis appears to have disproportionately affected 
prosperity.  See Jake Grovum, 2008 Financial Crisis Impact Still Hurting States, 
USA TODAY (Sept. 15, 2013), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2013/09/14/impact-on-states-of-
2008-financial-crisis/2812691/ 
(“By one Federal Reserve estimate, the country lost almost an entire year’s worth 
of economic activity – nearly $14 trillion – during the recession from 2007 to 
2009.”). 
 514.  Llewellyn’s early sociology of law appears to have taken such a view.  See 
Michael Ansaldi, The German Llewellyn, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 705, 761 (1992) (“The 
nature of large institutions is such that they contain homeostatic forces working 
to integrate molecular changes into their existing shape, trying to make the new 
elements fit into the prior structure without upsetting the internal dynamics 
among the institution’s other component parts, to reestablish a balance along the 
lines of what has gone before.”). 
 515.  This choice is consistent with the analogy to the lexicographical ordering 
of all four dimensions of development as equally important.  RAWLS, supra note 
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distribute future, post-crash social loss as evenly as possible 
between all four dimensions. 
This Article favors the second approach.  Pragmatically, it 
is not always possible to assess which area of development is 
hardest hit with any kind of immediacy.516 Attempting to 
develop the law by reference to an earlier equilibrium between 
the four dimensions of development therefore would be a 
difficult task to fulfill.517 A forward-looking approach to 
development is far easier to implement and as such practically 
preferable. 
The second, forward-looking approach is also more 
consistent with the four dimensions of development 
themselves.  Factual openness requires that legal development 
take into account the new factual circumstances postdating a 
crisis.518  This factual openness in turn entails narrow 
normative openness; new factual circumstances likely will 
require rule changes that are adapted to the new factual 
circumstances.519  Depending upon the severity of the crisis, 
the necessary rule changes may themselves reach a tipping 
point and affect common law standards.520 A backward-looking 
model of legal development is inconsistent with such factual 
and normative openness because it would downplay the 
importance of new factual circumstances for the benefit of 
recreating past equilibria that are no longer factually 
tenable.521 
Prosperity similarly is not served by a backward-looking 
approach.  In the context of financial crises such as the 2007-
08 U.S. financial crisis, the brunt of financial impact can be felt 
by middle class property owners.522  This in turn would lead to 
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a significant and disproportionate drop in the prosperity 
dimension of development.523  A backward-looking approach 
would advocate the use of legal developments to address this 
disproportionate drop immediately either through regulatory 
or common law reform.524  Such a reaction is likely to 
undermine long-term financial recovery and thus hurt the 
prosperity dimension of development in an attempt to bolster 
it.525  Prosperity depends upon the stability of the financial 
infrastructure.526  This infrastructure was badly hurt by 
financial crises such as the 2007-08 U.S. financial crisis.527  
Reform attempts that further impair the ability of that 
infrastructure to stabilize will have after effects in the “real” 
economy.528  Reform attempts that follow the current path to 
bolster infrastructure first on the other hand are likely to yield 
significant long-term growth permitting prosperity to increase 
in over time.529 
Freedom is also best effectuated by a forward-looking 
approach.  A critical component of freedom is that decisions are 
made by reference to the opinions or interests of those 
governed or affected by governmental action.530  The weaker 
the reference to the interests and opinions of those governed, 
the lesser the freedom of society.531  A backward-looking 
approach assumes that the opinions and interests of those 
governed in fact seek and are best served by an approximate 
restoration of an earlier equilibrium.  Unless actually tested, 
this assumption is itself arbitrary.  To test it, it is necessary to 
adopt a forward looking approach rather than a backward-
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financial stability). 
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looking approach. 
Criticality by definition is forward looking.  Its goal is 
precisely to test the adequacy of any traditional path—
including a prior equilibrium—against current 
circumstances.532  A backward-looking approach would 
suspend criticality because it would assume that the old 
equilibrium not only was in accord with the opinions and 
interests of those governed but that it also presented the most 
appropriate problem-solution when those opinions and 
interests were more fully scrutinized.533  Both of these 
assumptions may well prove correct—but they would need to 
be proved.  A forward looking approach is the best manner of 
doing so. 
D. Sequencing Path Dependence and A Place for Political 
Choice 
Government that follows the rule of law must leave 
significant room for political choice.534  Legal development 
cannot be an automaton that would run society on behalf of its 
citizens.535  It instead must provide the means for citizens to 
govern themselves. 
The political choice left open by legal development is which 
dimension to increase.  The requirement of Pareto superiority 
that no dimension be decreased does not end up in a single 
ideal solution of how all dimensions must be increased.536  
Pareto optimality provides a limit of optimal solutions.537  But 
Pareto optimality permits a rather large number of possible 
optimal solutions each of which have a different combination 
of ultimate values.538  The question of which of these optimal 
solutions to seek out—which cluster of superior arrangements 
to adopt over a period of time—is a political choice made within 
the confines of the legal process.539  It is a political choice that 
further significantly affects the society constituted under the 
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law in question—no one self-governing republican society is 
going to be alike to any other or take the same path as another. 
Even within the different dimensions, different policies 
could achieve similar net increases on each of the axioms in 
question in different ways.  There is more than one way to 
increase prosperity or freedom, more than one way to be open 
or judge critically.  This in turn means that the manner of 
increasing the measure of any one dimension of legal 
development also leaves room for political choice; it provides 
procedurally neutral strictures for substantive political 
engagement.540 
This place for politics in law and legal decision-making 
accounts for our everyday understanding of judicial behavior.  
Popular culture understands, for instance, that the Supreme 
Court renders political decisions.541  Nor is this understanding 
new—it in fact was well-observed as early as the 1830s.542 
But other than some commentators suggest, there remain 
truly legal strictures for judicial choice.543  This Article has 
highlighted both the values legal development must serve and 
how it must serve them.  Legal discourse differs from politics 
because it has a different process of decision-making that 
serves a narrower ingrained value structure than political 
discourse would. 
In other words, it is possible to determine when legal 
decisions have strayed too far from the current equilibrium of 
political self-governance by looking to the metrics of legal 
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development.  Decisions that have strayed too far afield are 
thus cognizably wrong as a matter of law because they have 
overstepped the political space created for the judiciary in the 
rule of law.  Future decisions overturning the earlier ones are 
certainly political.  But they are political with a legal purpose.  
The state of affairs required judicial activism in the same way 
that a bacterial infection may require a fever: while a fever is 
a deviation from an ordinary body temperature, it is a healthy 
response to the intrusion of a noxious foreign organism.  As 
with a bacterial infection and fever, it would be the absence of 
judicial activism that should be more alarming. 
CONCLUSION 
Robert Post notes that:  
[C]ourts face a dilemma.  If they do not act to protect 
essential values, the contestation of politics might spin out 
of control and undermine both the stability of the polity and 
the rule of law.  Agonism might degenerate into 
antagonism.  But if courts act too aggressively, they can 
suppress the very possibility of disagreement that defines 
politics itself.  This dilemma is insoluble if it is believed, as 
some do, that legal judgments “foreclose” the possibility of 
politics.  But if, as I have suggested, the boundary between 
law and politics is essentially contested, then judicial 
judgments engage but do not pre-empt politics.544 
Path dependence of the law provides part of the answer to 
Dean Post’s dilemma.  It provides courts with a safety net of 
past decisions as legitimation for their actions.  But path 
dependence alone obscured the underlying values of legal 
development.  It did not provide a sufficient reason that the 
relative caution of the courts was normatively wise or when 
and how departure from a current path is legitimate.  This 
Article enriched the theory of path dependence with a fuller 
normative account of the underlying grammar of legal 
development and its links with political discourse and 
sustainable self-governance. 
This account permits a glimpse at another, related 
question: what is the value of the rule of law?  This Article 
suggests that this value is the slow but sustainable increase of 
openness, prosperity, freedom, and criticality in a self-
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governing society.  It has showcased how this form of 
development is more than simply evolution—it is an ethically 
desirable condition ever expanding and securing the reaches of 
human capabilities and human flourishing. 
